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E T T E R T O  T H E E D I T O R
In Response
to Walter Gillis Peacock’s review in Hemisphere 6:1, David Stoll unites
W hen I published Between Two 
Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala,
I knew it would inflame some read­
ers because it breaks with solidarity 
interpretations of one of the most 
oppressive countries in Latin 
America. The solidarity movement 
is an international network which 
identifies the interests of the 
Guatemalan people with the guerril­
la movement and the popular orga­
nizations of the left. Exemplified by
I, Rigoberta Menchu, the most widely 
read book on Guatemala, solidarity 
thinking derives considerable plausi­
bility from the army’s record of bru­
tality. Indeed, having made hum an 
rights its main issue, the solidarity 
movement is easy to confuse with 
hum an rights activism. The two 
communities share many of the 
same discourses and constituencies. 
Yet if we want to cut through the 
tangle of assumptions which keep 
the last civil war in Central America 
tip and running, it’s im portant to 
make the distinction.
That the Guatemalan army has 
been an egregious violator of 
hum an rights, for example, does 
not mean that its guerrilla oppo­
nents are champions of hum an 
rights, even if they present them ­
selves as such. Yet while a hum an 
rights organization ought to attend 
to violations by both sides, a solidar­
ity organization will target only gov­
ernm ent abuses because its priority 
is supporting the revolutionary 
movement. A related blind-spot is 
that the solidarity movement has 
never acknowledged the guerrilla 
role in the escalation of political vio­
lence.
I believe this is why your reviewer 
Walter Gillis Peacock (W inter/Spring 
1994) is so offended that I blame
guerrilla raids for provoking the 
army’s occupation of northern  
Quiche Departm ent. He is so 
offended that he accuses me of lay­
ing the entire blame for the vio­
lence on the guerrillas and apolo­
gizing for the massacres of the 
Guatemalan army. Outrageous, 
Walter. Pointing out that the guer­
rillas fired the first shot, and that 
the army d id n ’t show up in north­
ern  Quiche until after that, is not 
the same as justifying the m urders 
the army committed. If I was so con­
cerned to exonerate the army, why 
does Between Two Armies publicize 
massacres that never m ade it into 
hum an rights reports?
Walter also objects that Between 
Two Armies is narrow and decontex- 
tualized. This despite the fact that 
it was a local, fieldwork-based study 
(for a wider study which comes to 
the same conclusion—that the guer­
rillas imposed an alien form of 
struggle on Mayan Indian commu­
nities with disastrous results—see 
Yvon Le Bot’s La Guerre en Terre 
Maya, published by Editions 
Karthala, Paris, 1992). The real 
problem, I suspect, is that the war- 
weary neutralism I found in a sup­
posed bastion of the guerrilla move­
m ent contradicts solidarity assump­
tions that this was a deeply rooted 
popular uprising.
In any case, my findings are 
empirical ones that can be tested 
through further research, without 
need for rhetorical analogies to the 
Zapatistas across the border in 
Mexico. Here I found W alter’s grat­
itude to the Zapatistas, for giving 
him a new guerrilla uprising to 
believe in, both revealing and worri­
some. If it is more im portant to 
maintain Guatemala as a m etaphor
for the culture of terror than it is to 
listen to peasants who are tired of 
being heaped on the altar of revolu­
tionary miscalculation, then peasant 
life is cheap even on the academic 
left.
The question for the future is 
w hether it is still sufficient to assign 
all the blame for the violence on 
the Guatemalan army, as the solidar­
ity movement is accustomed to do. 
O r whether after three decades of 
civil strife, in which Guatemalans 
seem almost as disgusted with the 
guerrillas as they are with the army, 
it is time to question rationales for 
violence by both sides. I fear that, 
because of confusion between soli­
darity and hum an rights assump­
tions, Guatemala’s status as a 
hum an rights pariah will justify the 
guerrillas to keep fighting long after 
they have lost most of the support 
they once enjoyed (Contrary to the 
review, no one ever said there were 
17,000 Ixils in the guerrilla-allied 
Communities of Population 
Resistance (CPRs) of the Sierra.
CPR officials used to claim that 
there were about 12,000, as report­
ed in my book; now this figure turns 
out to have been seriously inflated).
Far from apologizing for the 
Guatemalan army, my analysis of 
what happened to the guerrilla 
movement in northern  Quiche 
should be viewed as part of a long­
standing debate in Latin America 
over the wisdom of arm ed struggle. 
More such debate is badly needed in 
Guatemala, where the left faces a dif- 
ficult struggle to get out from under 
the shadow of its many martyrs. ■
David Stoll 
Davis, California
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Summi t  Madness
Eduardo A. Gamarra
The announcem ent that Miami would host the Summit of the Americas (December 9-11) spawned a veritable cottage indus­try based on the upcom ­
ing event. Non-profit organizations, 
universities, business, and others 
mobilized expecting that their pre- 
Summit scurrying could shape the 
agenda. With similar expectations, 
private and public institutions 
around Latin America launched 
campaigns to assure a presence in 
December.
Kind words for Latin America 
from the Florida establishment are 
normally scarce, but these days, 
praise for the region’s economic lib­
eralization and erstwhile democrati­
zation is legion. The state of Florida 
has bent over backwards to prepare 
for the Summit. After personally 
convincing President Clinton to 
hold the event in Miami, Governor 
Lawton Chiles appointed a m ultieth­
nic Summit Steering Committee to 
work with the State Department. 
Fearing that it would focus solely on 
Miami, Chiles also appointed a 
Florida Steering Committee to advo­
cate the local interests of places like 
Orlando, Tampa, and Jacksonville.
Although the crisis in Cuba and 
Haiti temporarily disrupted plan­
ning, there was never any doubt 
(given the ailing Florida tourist 
industry) that the show must go on. 
In late August, for example, uncon­
firmed rum ors began circulating
Eduardo Gamarra, associate professor■ of 
political science at Florida International 
University and the acting director of the 
Latin American and Caribbean Center, is 
the editor o/Hemisphere.
that the State D epartm ent was con­
sidering moving the Summit from 
Miami to de-emphasize the Cuban 
and Haitian debacles. The Steering 
committee moved with all due haste 
to squash the rum ors before they 
could get a toehold. Summit hyste­
ria is so strong in Florida that long­
term  plans for post Summit events 
are already afoot.
This autum n, pre-Summit confer­
ences dotted the hem isphere and 
the state. In addition to summits at 
the sub-regional level where heads 
of state are expected to discuss their 
respective Miami strategies, Florida
Political leaders are now 
expecting something more 
than yet another declaration 
o f fraternal affection.
and several Latin American partici­
pants have planned separate m eet­
ings on the environment, trade, 
transportation, and finance and 
banking. All of this has transpired 
without an official agenda. Most 
conference organizers have 
promised to produce white papers 
to be delivered to the heads of state 
during their two day encounter in 
Miami. At the current rate of pro­
duction, presidents and prim e min­
isters will have to dedicate the bet­
ter part of the winter to white paper 
reading.
President C linton’s invitation to 
the Summit outlined a broad agen­
da, citing democracy and good gov­
ernance, trade, investment, and sus­
tainable development. With such
generous parameters, it has been 
possible to include nearly every 
imaginable issue under the sun, 
from official corruption to NAFTA 
accession—but not Cuba and not 
Haiti. To the chagrin and em bar­
rassment of the Summit’s organiz­
ers, however, the Haitian and Cuban 
communities in Miami will not let 
Summit-hoppers forget. Official 
plans allow dem onstrations and 
o ther public expressions of discon­
tent, but dem onstrators will have no 
direct access to the visiting heads of 
state. Apart from pre-Summit 
events, the only o ther item in place 
is for provision of security to 34 
leaders and their delegations.
The other great absentee at the 
Summit will be the war on drugs, 
which so dom inated the Reagan- 
Bush era. Officials in the State 
D epartm ent’s Bureau of 
International Narcotics Matters note 
with disappointm ent that drugs will 
not appear on anyone’s agenda 
short list because the Summit orga­
nizers in Washington intend to dis­
cuss only positive dimensions of US- 
Western hem isphere ties. For the 
Andean countries this may be the 
most welcome news. Their concerns 
about developing export markets 
and the like may finally receive 
redress not conditioned on coun­
ternarcotics perform ance.
Clinton is counting on a much 
needed opportunity to establish 
some foreign policy credentials and 
some legitimacy in his hemispheric 
policy. Persons close to the 
President claim that Clinton will use 
the Summit to unveil the century’s 
“third most significant US policy ini­
tiative toward Latin America,” (the 
other two being the Good Neighbor 
Policy and the Alliance for Progress).
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The official agenda remains shrouded in mystery, 
but everyone wants in on the Summit anyway
This pronouncem ent has had 
great resonance throughout the 
hemisphere. Political leaders have 
reacted with a m arked degree of 
optimism and most are now expect­
ing something more than yet anoth­
er declaration of fraternal affection. 
In o ther words, Latin Americans, 
Caribbeans, and Canadians will 
come to Miami expecting the 
Clinton administration to deliver 
something of substance. For the 
region’s leaders, this would be a 
promise from Washington to expe­
dite free trade agreem ents and 
access to the US market, but the 
likelihood of serious mid-term elec­
toral setbacks dam pen prospects for
follow-through. If the past is pro­
logue, the leaders of the region will 
be disappointed one m ore time.
In short, Clinton will put a legit­
imizing seal on what are essentially 
Republican policies crafted in the 
waning days of the Cold War. 
Criticizing Clinton for continuity, 
especially in his Latin American 
policy, has become a new national 
pastime, but to expect this adminis­
tration to engage in radical depar­
tures misses a broader point. 
Clinton is the first president whose 
main task has been to dismantle 
not only the Cold War military arse­
nal, but the accompanying bureau­
cratic apparatus. His task is some­
what similar to the one Harry 
Trum an faced in the afterm ath of 
World War II. Several years elapsed 
before George Kennan and others 
crafted the Cold War strategy that 
guided US foreign policy for over 
three decades. The Clinton adm in­
istration has yet to find its George 
Kennan. So far the Ivy Leaguers 
who were brought in as Latin 
American advisors have failed to 
produce any coherent set of 
policy recom m endations. The 
Summit of the Americas may be 
the place and the timing may be 
correct for the launching of a new 
post Cold War Strategy vis-a-vis Latin 
America. I
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CENTER
The Latin American and Caribbean Center at 
Florida International University unveils 
SummitNet, an Internet information project 
for the upcoming Summit of the Americas. 
On December 9-11, 1994, the democratically 
elected heads of state of the Western 
Hemisphere will meet in Miami to discuss 
trade, governance, and the environment. 
SummitNet is your one-stop gateway for 
country profiles, official documents, M iami 
Herald articles, and independent commen­
taries. Point your Gopher client software to 
SUMMIT.FIU.EDU. You can e-mail SUM- 
MIT.FIU.EDU or call (305) 348-2894 for 
more information.
FLO RIDA IN T E R N A T IO N A L  UN IVERSITY
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Commentary
Fault  Lines
Lisandro Perez
A
 bittersweet joke circulat­
ing in Cuba last year tells 
of the situation twenty 
years from now when the 
island’s development 
regresses so much that it 
resembles the Stone Age, with its 
inhabitants foraging for food in an 
overgrown wilderness, isolated from 
the rest of the world. Two Cubans, 
in their loincloths, are attem pting 
to make a fire by striking stones 
together, but the stones keep break­
ing. “I’ll tell you,” says one to the 
other, “if Fidel does not give us bet­
ter stones, there’s going to be a lot 
of trouble in this country.”
The resiliency of the Cuban gov­
ernm ent in the face of ram pant 
deterioration in the population’s 
standard of living has baffled 
observers and frustrated its ene­
mies. The country’s economic crisis 
(dubbed “the special period” by the 
government) dates to the loss of 
subsidized trade and assistance from 
the form er Soviet bloc. The crisis 
has been deepened by the unwill­
ingness of the regime to institute 
m arket-oriented reforms that would 
increase production and services. 
The US embargo has not helped 
matters.
At the household level, the situa­
tion is desperate. If there is any 
hope of having the bare necessities, 
Cubans must resort to illegal trans­
actions. Access to the US dollar, the 
only viable currency, is critical. Yet, 
there has been very little evidence, 
as the joke reflects, that the eco-
Lisandro Perez is a sociologist and 
director of the Cuban Research Institute 
at Florida International University.
nomic crisis poses a threat to the 
stability of the government.
That is, until the start of Cuba’s 
hot August, featuring several clashes 
between dem onstrators and security 
forces. For the first time in more 
than three decades, the streets of 
Cuba have seen open defiance of 
the regime by the population. The 
largest confrontation occurred on 
August 5 as a crowd estimated in 
excess of 10,000 persons battled 
police along Havana’s waterfront.
While street clashes are a new ele­
m ent in the Cuban landscape, they 
occur within a Cold War context 
that is as old as the Revolution. Just 
when it looks as if the developments 
might take a fresh course, they 
rapidly become trapped in time, 
replays of recurrent themes. The 
events of the past few weeks, both in 
Washington and Havana, are good 
examples of those perennial 
themes.
Migration as a catalyst and escape 
valve. Migration has been for 35 
years the principal manifestation of 
dissent and discontent. And so it 
was again this m onth. The spark for 
the street dem onstrations in Havana 
August 5 was the rum or that the 
governm ent would allow anyone to 
leave. The crowd congregated at the 
waterfront, not in front of govern­
m ent buildings, its message: we are 
fed up and we want to leave. When 
the clamor reaches an unbearable 
pitch, and the num ber of illegal 
departures increases, Fidel Castro 
allows people to leave. It is then that 
the US, fearing an exodus, focuses 
attention on Cuba. Castro success­
fully alters US migration policy and 
gets an escape valve for discontent, 
giving his rule a new lease. Since
the day he allowed people to leave, 
there haven’t been reports of 
dem onstrations in Havana.
Everyone in Cuba who is fed up is 
busy building a raft.
US-Cuba policy is determined pri­
marily by domestic political concerns. 
With no real national security or 
strategic issue at stake with Cuba, 
and with no evident political pres­
sure for a tu rnaround in policy, US 
policy towards Cuba becomes a 
creature of domestic politics. And 
this time it is not even presidential 
politics, but merely the reelection of 
the incum bent Democratic gover­
nor of Florida. O ne evening last 
week, that governor ushered into 
the White House a group of 
Miamians he presumably deemed 
representative of the Cuban com­
munity. The message to Clinton was: 
the new policy of not accepting 
rafters must be balanced with pun­
ishment for Castro, otherwise 
Cuban Miami will be unhappy. The 
President agrees to get tougher with 
Castro because the Governor 
believes that otherwise he “and the 
President would have been in dras­
tic trouble in Florida.”
Limited get-tough options. Having 
agreed to punish Castro, the 
President has very few viable 
options, all of them  fairly pusillani­
mous. O ne is to increase the hours 
of transmission of the US radio and 
television broadcasts beamed to 
Cuba. The other is to tighten the 
only loose screw left in the em bar­
go: cash remittances and family vis­
its to Cuba by Cuban Americans. 
Among the Miamians visiting the 
White House there was overwhelm­
ing support for prohibiting such
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Recurrent themes plague US-Cuba issues
transactions and trips. Not one of 
them  represents that sector of the 
community whose prim ary concern 
is helping their family members in 
Cuba. But even those measures are 
not regarded as tough enough by 
many in the community, including 
the Cuban-American members of 
Congress. So the next move is to 
have a top aide casually bluff, on 
national television, that a military 
blockade is a possibility.
The get-tough policy is based on rais­
ing the level of suffering and exaspera­
tion of the Cuban people. In this last 
round of decisions, the US in effect 
collaborates with Castro in keeping 
a barrier between families and limits 
critical assistance to family members 
in Cuba. Presumably, this is justified 
because that suffering will inex­
orably lead to an unspecified chain 
of events (probably chaotic and vio­
lent) through which Castro will 
somehow be ousted and democracy 
instituted in Cuba. The question­
able theory behind this is that eco­
nomic hardship leads to political 
change and that fom enting chaos in 
Cuba is consistent with the national 
security interests of the US.
The get-tough policies have thus far 
not been effective. After more than 
three decades of a policy of hostility 
and isolation, Castro is still there. 
The new get-tough measures will 
undoubtedly reach new heights of 
ineffectiveness. If people cannot 
send cash remittances to family 
members, they will have a greater 
incentive to travel to Cuba to take 
the cash themselves. The new 
restrictions, of course, do not allow 
direct flights from the US to Cuba, 
so the solution will be to go through
a nearby third country. The happi­
est person in Havana right now is 
the m anager of Cuba’s decrepit 
national airline. Cubana can fly to 
those third countries and pick up 
the visitors and fly them  in and out 
o f Havana. If this policy persists, 
they may yet make enough money 
to replace their entire fleet of old 
Soviet planes.
These recurren t themes are get­
ting old and worn, and each time 
they have been replayed over the 
past four decades they have taken a 
considerable toll am ong the Cuban 
people, here and in the island. It is 
time that the US take its Cuba poli­
cy seriously, not just react to each 
successive crisis. The Clinton adm in­
istration should initiate a process of 
systematic deliberations and consul­
tations with a broad range of 
experts and interest groups so as to 
arrive at a coherent Cuba policy 
that will truly prom ote the national 
security interests of US and democ­
racy in Cuba. Consultations with the 
Cuban-American community should 
be broadly based, not limited to a 
handful of anointed spokespersons. 
Im plem entation of that policy 
should not be influenced by the 
electoral situation in Florida.
If nothing changes in Washington, 
why should anyone there expect any 
changes in Cuba? I
A version of this article originally 
appeared in the London Observer 
and is reprinted here with the kind 
permission of the author.
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Afta NAFTA
Raul Benitez Manaut
President C linton’s support o f the North American Free Trade Agreement signaled continuity, but Mexico is marginal to his foreign policy. In 1993, 
political pressure from domestic 
constituencies produced NAFTA 
side agreem ents on labor and envi­
ronm ental issues. On the Mexican 
side, President Carlos Salinas’s con­
trol over his Senate and House of 
Representatives rendered similar 
obstacles to approval non-existent. 
In contrast, NAFTA opponents in 
the US were im portant. Among 
them  was the form er presidential 
candidate, Ross Perot.
Gore-Perot
On November 9, 1993 CNN 
broadcasted a debate between Vice 
President A1 Gore and Ross Perot. 
Host Larry King’s opening remarks 
honed in on the central question: 
will NAFTA be good for Americans 
or not? Much of the debate synthe­
sized American perceptions about 
Mexico.
Gore defended NAFTA as an 
opportunity to create the “largest 
m arket in the world.” Perot criti­
cized the overwhelming poverty of 
the majority (“85% of the Mexican 
people work in absolute poverty”) , 
and Mexico’s lack of democracy. 
Defending recent political changes 
in Mexico, Gore emphasized 
NAFTA’s overwhelming role in that 
country’s future, warning that US
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Congressional rejection of NAFTA 
would provoke a nationalist “reac­
tion” in Mexico. The vice president 
concluded by placing the issue 
between the “politics of fear” and 
the “politics of h ope”.
US opinion on Mexico is polar­
ized: At one extreme, Mexico is 
seen as a poor, undem ocratic coun­
try without a future. At the other, it 
is a country on its way to m odern­
ization, overcoming obstacles to 
make the jum p into the first world. 
Mexican reality is midway between 
these two opinions, and far more 
complex.
One can neither hide the 
social reali ty of Mexico 
nor underestimate the 
accelerated pace of change.
O ne can neither hide the social 
reality of Mexico nor underestim ate 
the accelerated pace of change 
favoring economic m odernization 
and democratization, incomplete 
though it may be. Mexicans also 
have a distorted view of the U nited 
States. Public opinion is nationalist, 
anti-imperialist, or favors good rela­
tions with the United States.
34 Votes
On November 17, 1993, US House 
of Representatives approved NAFTA 
by a margin of 34 votes, a trium ph 
for both Clinton and Salinas. In the 
US, the winners were the big corpo­
rations, who for the most part 
backed NAFTA from the beginning. 
Ratification coincided with the
favorable conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round of GATT. In both countries, 
non-competitive small and middle 
sized industries anticipated taking 
the hardest hit.
There are notable differences in 
the way NAFTA will affect each 
country. Because of the US-Canada 
precedent, NAFTA did not call for 
changes in federal legislation, nor 
in the law of the various states that 
can expect major NAFTA-induced 
changes. By contrast, Mexican law 
had to be substantially modified to 
allow NAFTA; im portant parts of 
the Constitution, a product of the 
revolution, were modified for the 
same reason.
During bilateral negotiations, the 
Mexican governm ent succeeded in 
forestalling reforms to the energy 
(i.e., petroleum ) sector, but did 
make notable changes in agrarian 
law (i.e., the repeal of Article 27, 
the basis of the Mexican ejido sys­
tem) . Anticipated changes in the 
labor law designed to draw foreign 
investment are expected to have 
im portant political repercussions, 
since the Mexican political system is 
predicated on the ruling party’s his­
toric control over worker and peas­
ant unions.
The US vision of Mexico contin­
ues to be polarized despite NAFTA 
passage. Large sectors of the “estab­
lishm ent” oppose NAFTA on the 
grounds that US workers cannot 
compete with Mexican labor, which 
is seven times cheaper.
Proponents, including Presidents 
Clinton and Bush, point to consoli­
dated and working economic 
reforms in Mexico, and predict that 
NAFTA will both hasten a political 
transition toward democracy while 
fostering a stable framework for it.
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The promise of prosperity drives US-Mexico relations
Chiapas
The political stability of Mexico 
was tested on January 1, 1994, the 
first day of NAFTA im plementation 
and the debut of Zapatista guerrillas 
in San Cristobal de las Casas, whose 
first com m unique read “we have 
declared war as of January 1st 
because of the im plem entation of 
the Free Trade Agreem ent.”
Chiapas changed the course of 
Mexican politics, casting a pall over 
the Salinas adm inistration and m od­
ifying expectations about the future 
of the Mexican economy. It led 
im portant sectors of public opinion 
to question NAFTA as the best way 
of joining the first world. In the 
US, the image of the m odern 
Mexico that helped ratify NAFTA is 
in doubt.
Prior to Chiapas, a favorable 
investment climate sent large quan­
tities of dollars into Mexico. At the 
expense of industry, most of the 
money went into the stock 
exchange, which is sensitive to per­
ceptions of political stability. The 
presidential candidate of the official 
party Luis Donaldo Colosio led the 
polls well ahead of this nearest con­
tenders, Cuauhtem oc Cardenas of 
the Revolutionary Democratic Party, 
and Diego Fernandez of the 
Authentic National Party.
The immediate effect of Chiapas 
was to damage the image of 
President Salinas, and in turn, his 
candidate Colosio. The Mexican 
army came under fire for hum an 
rights abuses, and then the govern­
m ent called for a cease-fire on 
January 12. In a radical departure 
from the traditional response of 
Latin American governments to 
insurgents, the Salinas government 
sought a political close to the con­
flict. It agreed to major changes in 
the Cabinet and the establishment 
of a Commission on Peace and 
Reconciliation.
Chiapas changed the course 
of Mexican politics. It led 
important sectors of public 
opinion to question NAFTA 
as the best way of joining 
the first world.
The US Embassy sent an observer 
mission to Chiapas to see for itself. 
National Security Council advisor 
Richard Feinberg, assigning a very 
high specific weight to US influence 
in the Mexican decision making 
process, and ignoring internal 
changes, said military maneuvers 
were restrained, and a repetition of 
1968 [Tlateloco Massacre] was 
avoided because the Mexican gov­
ernm ent had signed onto NAFTA.
Public opinion in the US was 
harsh on Salinas, criticizing his han­
dling of Chiapas, his capacity to 
maintain stability, and the social 
consequences of economic m odern­
ization in general. Mexican instabil­
ity once again became an issue of 
US national security. Following the 
March 23, 1994 assassination of Luis 
Donaldo Colosio, Clinton dem on­
strated US com m itm ent to prevent­
ing economic and political crisis in 
Mexico, moving immediately to 
extend a $6 billion line of credit to 
the government.
Early 1994 statements from 
Clinton adm inistration officials 
belie a preoccupation with Mexico.
They forswear any inclination to 
intervene in Mexico’s internal mat­
ters, and promise to support whoev­
er wins the August 21 presidential 
election. The Inter-American 
Dialogue (an organization with 
close ties to Clinton's Latin America 
advisors) pronounced that “free 
elections are the only course for the 
stabilization of Mexico.”
Conclusions
Anything beyond NAFTA,
Chiapas, stability, and a transition to 
democracy is secondary to bilateral 
relations. Evaluations of Mexican 
anti-narcotics policy have been posi­
tive, although discussions over US 
law enforcem ent agents abducting 
Mexican citizens inside Mexico 
linger. There are border problems 
arising from the poor treatm ent of 
illegal Mexican immigrants, as well 
as an unresolved dispute over the 
US embargo on Mexican tuna. 
Differences over Central America 
are gone, and military relations, 
though not substantial, are good. 
The principal concern over US 
national security in Mexico 
revolves around political stability, 
and the threat of social decomposi­
tion and ungovernability. If NAFTA 
is to be im plem ented as envisioned 
by both Presidents Bush and 
Clinton, it is critical that the 1994 
presidential succession and the 
Mexican transition to democracy be 
successful. ■
Editor’s postscript — As this article went 
to press, wire services reported the assas­
sination, by an unknown assailant, of 
Francisco Ruiz Maciel, Secretary General 
of the PRI.
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Calling the Shots
Da n  o Moreno
The election of William Jefferson Clinton as the first Democratic president in twelve years did not sig­nificantly change US poli­cy toward Cuba. The pres­
ident’s policy is still dom inated by 
the perspectives and rhetoric of the 
Cold War era; it continues the hard­
line approach of its Republican pre­
decessors by m aintaining the US 
trade embargo against Cuba, oppos­
ing renewal of diplomatic relations, 
and broadcasting anti-Castro news 
to Cuba through both Radio and 
TV Marti. Despite heavy criticism 
from US allies in Western Europe 
and Latin America, Clinton remains 
committed to isolating the island 
until Castro steps down or m eaning­
ful democratic reforms are initiated.
C linton’s Cuba policy is best 
understood in the context of 
domestic US politics and the place 
that Cuban-Americans hold in 
them. Cuban-Americans have 
become the single most im portant 
interest group shaping Cuban poli­
cy. To woo them away from their 
traditional alliance with the 
Republican party, the President has 
been reluctant to alter the rigid 
stance of his conservative predeces­
sors.
The Miami Strategy
Cuban communities are concentrat­
ed in the im portant electoral states 
of Florida and New Jersey, where
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the Democrats had a fighting 
chance for the first time since the 
1976 presidential race. Clinton was 
the first Democratic presidential 
nom inee to actively court the 
Cuban vote in Florida. His south­
ern  electoral base and relatively 
secure status in most “must win” 
states presented a rare opportunity 
for a serious Democratic campaign 
in Florida. Moreover, Cuban- 
American voting behavior showed 
signs of diversifying
During several visits to Florida, 
Clinton assured Cuban-Americans 
that he would lay the groundwork 
for reversing some of the lingering 
bitterness of President Kennedy’s 
withdrawal of support for exiles dur­
ing the Bay of Pigs, and Jimmy 
C arter’s controversial 1977 dialogue 
with Castro. The Miami strategy of 
the Democratic presidential candi­
date was to assure the Cuban- 
American community that an 
adm inistration of his party would 
not lift the economic embargo; ergo 
his early and highly public endorse­
m ent of the Torricelli bill. Soon 
afterwards, Clinton spent a night 
raising $125,000 at two separate 
Miami fundraisers attended pre­
dominantly by Cuban-Americans. 
Follow-up visits by Hillary Clinton 
(whose sister-in-law Maria Victoria 
Arias, a Cuban-American 
Republican, mobilized fellow 
Cuban-Americans for Clinton) and 
Tipper Gore were also successes.
Clinton took his campaign for 
Cuban-American votes to New 
Jersey, whose 17 electoral college 
votes had gone Republican in every 
presidential race since 1964. With 
the nation’s second largest Cuban- 
American community, New Jersey, 
which had given Reagan, Bush, and
form er Republican Governor Tom 
Kean wide majorities, figured 
prom inently in the GOP’s strategy. 
To appeal to the state’s Cuban- 
Americans, Clinton stressed his 
close ties to the Torricelli bill and 
nam ed Robert Menendez, a Cuban- 
American Democrat and 
Congressional candidate, to head 
the New Jersey Hispanic campaign.
While formally endorsing Bush, 
Jorge Mas Canosa, head of the influ­
ential Cuban American National 
Foundation (CANF) had heavy con­
tact with Clinton. Mas Canosa 
attended a Clinton fundraiser in 
Miami’s Little Havana, displaying a 
pragmatic streak within an organiza­
tion often inaccurately depicted as 
singularly tied to the Republicans. 
He announced that “although I’m 
voting for Bush out of loyalty, 
C linton’s decisive support of the 
Cuban Democracy Act tu rned  the 
Cuban-American community 
around.” Beyond opening the lines 
of communication with the CANF,
IB Cuban-American members of 
Dade County’s 120 m em ber 
Republican Executive Committee 
endorsed Clinton in Septem ber 
1993, expressing their belief that 
the Democrat would do more than 
had Bush to rid Cuba of Castro.
Money Talks
Though Clinton carried New 
Jersey, his Florida campaign fell 
short of cutting into Bush’s two per 
cent margin of victory there.
Despite the loss, the new ties forged 
with Miami’s Cuban elite were 
unprecedented, and continued into 
the presidency. The Democratic 
National Committee raised over 
$500,000 from Cuban contributors 
in a 1994 Miami presidential
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Cuban-Americans politics drives presidential foreign policy
fundraiser; and when prom inent 
Cuban Americans opposed the 
nom ination of Mario Baeza for 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs, Clinton acceded 
(see article b y johanna Mendelson 
Form an). The adm inistration also 
defended the controversial TV 
Marti project against charges that it 
was a poor use of public resources. 
Vice-President A1 Gore not only 
made clear that the administration 
was committed to TV Marti but 
declared that it planned on “turn­
ing up the volum e” on radio and 
television broadcast aim ed at the 
island. W hen faced with the techni­
cal difficulties confronting TV Marti, 
Gore is reported to have replied 
tersely, “Let’s try to make it work.”
The adm inistration also backed 
off the nom ination of Elio E.
Muller, a Tampa lawyer who ran the 
Hispanic campaign for Clinton in 
Florida, to be director of the US 
Inform ation Agency’s Office of 
Cuban Broadcasting—the office 
that oversees Radio and TV Marti. 
According to sources at Radio 
Marti, CANF opposed Muller, not 
on ideological grounds but because 
of personal enmity between Muller 
and Mas Canosa.
“Unshakable”
In short, the Clinton administra­
tion has gone out of its way to 
assure Cuban-Americans that there 
will be no softening of US policy 
toward Cuba. At a May 20, 1993 
White House event to honor Cuban 
Independence Day, Clinton reiterat­
ed support for the Torricelli bill and 
promised Cuban-Americans from 
both parties that he would maintain 
the embargo. Six months later, 
Alexander Watson, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs, echoed these sen­
timents at a CANF-sponsored 
fundraiser in Miami, promising that 
the Clinton team would “continue 
to pursue those issues that succes­
sive administrations have deter­
m ined to be in our national inter­
est. [The possibility of softening the 
Cuba policy] is false. Let there be 
no confusion; our com m itm ent to 
hum an rights and democracy for 
the Cuban people is unshakable.” 
The political influence of the 
Cuban-American community in 
shaping Cuban policy has been 
underscored during the recent 
immigration crisis. Over the sum­
m er of 1994, Cuban citizens, some­
times on hom em ade rafts, began 
trying to cross the Straits of Florida 
to reach Key West. By August, the 
US Coast Guard was rescuing 
upwards of 2000 rafters a day. 
Clinton, facing a flood of fleeing 
Cubans, reversed long-standing US 
immigration policy and ordered 
that Cubans without US visas no 
longer be automatically adm itted 
into the US. Cuban-American polit­
ical leaders seized this opportunity 
to induce further tightening of the 
embargo. After an August 19 m eet­
ing with Governor Lawton Chiles 
(D-FL), Jorge Mas Canosa, and 
o ther South Florida community 
leaders, the President imposed four 
new restrictions on US-Cuban com­
mercial transaction: (1) The 
Treasury D epartm ent announced 
that sending money to Cuba would 
be against the law in most cases.
(2) Travel from the US to Cuba 
became illegal except for “hum ani­
tarian reasons.” (3) Gift parcels to 
Cuba would be limited to "humani­
tarian items:” food, vitamins, seeds,
medicine and medical supplies, 
clothing and other products speci­
fied by the US D epartm ent of 
Commerce; and (4) the US would 
begin pressuring the United Nations 
to condem n the state of hum an 
rights in Cuba. Moreover, while the 
Clinton administration agreed to 
open talks with the Cuban govern­
m ent on migration, it has promised 
not to discuss broader political and 
economic issues with the Castro 
regime without evidence of serious 
democratic opening.
Cuban-American voters dem on­
strated that their vote must be court­
ed, and the rising prom inence of 
this voting bloc in presidential cam­
paigns will keep Cuba on the foreign 
policy agenda for the foreseeable 
future. Republicans and Democrats 
alike have displayed a willingness, if 
not an eagerness, to grant Cuban- 
Americans veto power over US poli­
cy toward Cuba. In the post-Cold 
War period, decision-makers con­
front a domestic arena with a wide 
array of politically influential 
groups. The absence of a hegemon­
ic foreign policy paradigm broadens 
opportunities for divergent domestic 
interests to shape specific areas of 
policy. Cuban-Americans have taken 
advantage of this situation to 
become far more influential in the 
US political system than mere num ­
bers might suggest. There are 
approximately one million people of 
Cuban descent in the US—barely 
seven percent of the total Latino 
population. These numbers, howev­
er, do not reflect the rapid mobiliza­
tion of the Cuban-American commu­
nity in US politics, where it has con­
verted its influence in presidential 
electoral politics into direct influ­
ence on Clinton’s foreign policy. M
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Democracy and Debris
Tricia Juhn
S
ince the Farabundo Marti 
Liberation Front 
(FMLN)’s first major 
offensive in January 1981, 
US administrations have 
sought simultaneously to 
prevent a leftist takeover and to cre­
ate space for democratic institu­
tions. During the Salvadoran civil 
war (1979-1992), the US govern­
m ent provided over $6 billion in 
material assistance, over a third of 
which went directly to security 
forces while supporting the political 
programs of the governing 
Christian Democrats (PDC).
Each of the US presidents who 
held office during the Salvadoran 
war left his mark. The hum an 
rights emphasis of the Carter 
administration gave way to security 
priorities in El Salvador. By contin­
ually escalating military assistance 
while ignoring death squad activity, 
Ronald Reagan helped to turn El 
Salvador into a volatile partisan 
issue in Congress. When Bush 
became president, he sought 
methodically to disengage the 
United States from El Salvador.
Events abroad cooperated with 
President Bush, whose inauguration 
came only two m onths before the 
election of Alfredo Cristiani, an oli­
garch from the “practical” wing of 
the rightist ARENA (National 
Republican Alliance) party. In 
November 1989, during the guerril­
las’ largest coordinated siege of the 
capital city, the Berlin Wall came
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down, heralding the close of the 
Cold War era. Subsequently, negoti­
ating teams representing the gov­
ernm ent of El Salvador and the 
FMLN spent 22 months in United 
Nations sponsored peace talks. 
These culm inated in the December 
31, 1991 New York Agreement, and 
the ensuing cease-fire signed 
January 16, 1992, in Mexico City.
Once the agenda toward reconcil­
iation had been set, American offi­
cials maneuvered deftly to keep it 
moving, receiving ex-guerrilla lead­
ers in the hallowed halls of the 
Capitol and exclusive Washington 
dinner clubs. Although US officials 
m onitored the negotiations, the 
official contribution came in the 
form of cash. The US government 
donated $209 million of the estimat­
ed $1.8 billion needed over three 
years for a wide range of social 
reforms stressing cooperation with 
multilateral organizations, particu­
larly ONUSAL (United Nations 
Observer Mission in El Salvador) 
and international finance agencies. 
Bush’s strategy of diminishing the 
US profile in Salvadoran politics was 
made possible by the activism of the 
two UN secretaries general, under 
whom the reforms were negotiated 
(Javier Perez de Cuellar) and then 
im plem ented (Boutros Boutros 
Ghali).
By the time Clinton took office in 
January 1993, the Salvadoran peace 
accords were almost one year into 
formal im plementation, and the 
cease-fire was holding beyond any­
one’s best expectation. Clinton 
loaded up his inter-American staff 
with experienced Latin Americanists 
(see article by Johanna Mendelson 
Forman) whose principal concerns 
in El Salvador were to provide mate­
rial and political support for the 
post-war reconstruction, culminat­
ing in the 1994 elections. Beyond 
that, Clinton seized the opportunity 
presented by the satisfactory 
progress of the peace accords to 
downplay the Salvadoran role in US 
politics, so much so that one long 
time development professional in 
Salvador characterized the Clinton 
policy as “rupture with benign 
neglect.”
The US embassy staff in-country 
was turned  over, so that few, if any, 
have been in-country m ore than a 
year; a move which indicates that lit­
tle of what has gone on before is rel­
evant now. Form er Deputy Chief of 
Mission Peter Romero was appoint­
ed to Ecuador. He was replaced in 
April 1993 by Ambassador Alan 
Flanigan, the form er Chief of the 
Havana Interests Section. An accom­
plished career diplomat, Flanigan’s 
appointm ent is noteworthy because 
he has no regional experience, 
another sign that the Clinton 
administration is not seeking to up 
our ante in-country.
Clinton has m aintained US sup­
port of democratic programs in El 
Salvador, but unlike his three prede­
cessors, has not launched any major 
political initiatives. In the post-war 
era, El Salvador has gotten attention 
proportionate to its role in the 
inter-American system; and anything 
less than the obsessive attention it 
received over the last ten years must 
feel like benign neglect. 
Contributing to this perception is 
that, like the rest of the President’s 
foreign policy, problems arising out 
of Salvador are now resolved on a 
crisis m anagem ent basis. The long 
delay in confirming assistant secre­
tary of inter-American affairs
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Now that the war is over, the real fighting begins
Alexander Watson, for example, 
hints at a lack of coordination at 
interm ediate levels.
Central American fatigue on the 
Hill is credited with having created 
an essentially short-sighted attitude 
best summarized as “the peace 
process is far enough along, the 
elections were clean enough, we’re 
out.” Such attitudes reflect a gener­
al downplaying of all Latin 
American resource commitment, 
although El Salvador did relatively 
well, principally because of individu­
als in the administration with long­
standing commitments to 
Salvadoran outcomes.
Nevertheless, the oft-lauded 
“peace dividend” has been less than 
magnanimous: $69.1 million in US 
aid for FY 1995, as com pared to 
$230 million in FY 1993 and $94 
million in FY 1994. US support for 
the Salvadoran reconstruction is 
principally disbursed through the 
revamped and re-focused USAID, 
whose country strategy targets 
poverty alleviation, economic devel­
opm ent, family planning, health 
care, and environm ental conserva­
tion. In an about-face from previ­
ous years, AID is emphasizing bot­
tom up growth through m icroenter­
prise, targeting single female heads 
of households and their dependents 
as principal beneficiaries of income 
and employment generating pro­
jects. Development officials are now 
less circumscribed by policy or secu­
rity in their choice of beneficiaries 
and Salvadoran national counter­
parts. Some non-governm ent orga­
nizations (NGOs) and grassroots 
associations have retained a partisan 
tinge, but aid is now awarded more 
on perform ance than politics. After 
a hiatus of m ore than ten years, the
Peace Corps was to deploy its first 
group of volunteers in this year, 
mostly over the central and eastern 
parts of the country.
The peace accords call for a new 
civilian police force and academy, a 
land transfer program, and a 
National Reconstruction Plan to 
reintegrate ex-guerrillas into civil 
society. These programs, particular­
ly the evolution of the new police 
force and its relations with the 
arm ed forces, progressed under 
minute multilateral scrutiny.
The carelessness with 
which these elections were 
organized belied the 
political class’s true 
and deep disdain of the 
average Salvadoran.
Here too, the contribution of the 
Clinton Latin American team has 
been to allow Salvadorans and the 
UN to take the lead. Rather than 
taking control of Salvadoran politi­
cal processes, the US has rem ained 
a cheerful and im portant sideline 
supporter. For example, US person­
nel in-country provide technical 
and material assistance to the 
under-trained, under-equipped 
National Civilian Police (PNC).
In a country with El Salvador’s 
grim past, C linton’s most valuable 
contribution has been to signal his 
preference for transparency in poli­
tics. The General Accounting 
Office (GAO) has published no less 
than three reports tracking the
progress of the new civilian police 
force in particular, and the peace 
accords in general, but the US has 
not dom inated the remedial 
process. The Clinton administra­
tion also supported potentially deli­
cate UN initiatives like the July 1993 
release of the Report of the Truth 
Commission, which led to the resig­
nation of the army high command. 
In the spring of 1994, Clinton 
declassified embassy cable traffic 
from the Reagan and Bush years, 
which confirmed that the US gov­
ernm ent knew about form er 
Minister of Defense Rene Emilio 
Ponce’s involvement in the 1989 
m urder of six Jesuit priests, and that 
President Armando Calderon Sol 
had provided at least financial sup­
port for death squads during the 
war.
In the 1994 elections, ARENA and 
a leftist coalition (of the FMLN, the 
Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, 
and the Convergencia Democratica), 
placed first and second respectively. 
The Christian Democrats dropped 
to third place, succumbing defini­
tively and publicly to intra-party fac­
tionalism. A run off in the follow­
ing m onth gave ARENA candidate 
Calderon Sol (the form er mayor of 
San Salvador) 68% of the vote to 
Ruben Zam ora’s 32%.
Among the 3900 foreign observers 
was a US delegation headed by US 
AID director Brian Atwood. On a 
National Public Radio interview fol­
lowing the first round, Atwood 
refuted charges that ARENA had a 
calculated strategy to commit fraud, 
but did gently admonish the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal to cor­
rect (for the run-off) the undeliv­
ered carnets, names missing from 
registration lists, 2-3 hour waits, cast­
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ing of ballots without secrecy, and 
the “raton loco” (crazy rat)—voters 
running  around looking for the cor­
rect voting center. While these elec­
tions were a marked improvement 
over a state of civil war, it is widely 
accepted that some 70-100,000 citi­
zens, many illiterate, were deprived 
of their right to vote. The official 
US delegation made an effort to put 
the most optimistic face on the elec­
tions, but others were more forth­
right in their criticism. One jo u r­
nalist noted that the “carelessness 
with which these elections were 
organized and then im plem ented 
belied the political class’s true and 
deep disdain of the average 
Salvadoran.”
By acceding to elections and a 
package of procedural reforms ham ­
m ered out in post-war negotiations, 
the outer limits of extremist politics 
moved inward, principally by forsak­
ing the institutionalized application
of violence as an arbiter of conflict. 
This was a clear victory for both 
Salvadoran democracy and US for­
eign policy. Nonetheless, El 
Salvador is living testament to the 
limited ability of the U nited States 
to control events, even in the small­
est, weakest states. If peace and 
prosperity are not forthcoming 
here—and, in the short run, they 
certainly will not be—then how to 
proceed in Haiti, Cuba, or Mexico?
Reconstruction in a democratic 
context is m ore difficult because of 
the deaths from illness of three 
Salvadorans who, regardless of their 
ideologies, had the virtue of being 
skilled politicians: Napoleon 
Duarte, Guillermo Ungo, and 
Roberto D’Aubuisson. Few equal to 
their verve have em erged to lead El 
Salvador. N either Calderon Sol’s 
com m itm ent to democratic reform  
nor his general com petence enjoys 
widespread confidence. The FMLN
has already begun to fragment, and 
the PDC must identify a more com­
petitive presidential candidate 
(Fidel Chavez Mena has now lost 
two races).
Although President Clinton has 
been widely criticized for his timid 
and tentative approach to foreign 
policy challenges, this attitude may 
have fom ented democratization in 
El Salvador as much as the activism 
of his predecessors. C linton’s con­
tribution to US-E1 Salvadoran rela­
tions has offered the resources and 
good offices of the U nited States in 
support of Salvadoran and multilat­
eral initiatives. “O ur task is to help 
Salvadorans construct the kind of 
society they want during an era of 
scarce resources. This is a big jo b ,” 
says the new regional director of the 
Peace Corps in Central America, Vic 
Johnson. “But Salvadorans them ­
selves have to decide what kind of 
society they want, and work for it.” ■
Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships at the University o f  Florida
The Center fo r Latin Am erican Studies and the Center fo r A frican Studies inv ite  ju n io r  and senior scholars to par­
tic ipa te  in an in te rd isc ip lina ry  program  on A fro -A m erican  iden tity  and cu ltu ra l d ivers ity  in the Am ericas, inc lud ing  
the Caribbean, Brazil, the US, and the sending areas o f A frica . Funded by the Rockefe ller Foundation, the program 
w ill enable v is iting  scholars in the hum anities to spend a year o r a semester at the U n ivers ity  o f F lorida to do 
research in th is area.
The program  w ill focus on three interre lated issues in the fo llo w in g  sequence: 1) 1993-94 on the in tersection o f 
race, class and gender; 2) 1994-95 on literature, re lig ion  and popu la r cu ltu re ; 3) 1995-96 on h istorica l processes 
o f adapta tion to the physical env ironm ent through research on m aterial cu lture , eco log ica l systems and the bu ilt 
environm ent.
By February 3 ,1 9 9 5 ,  candidates shou ld subm it (1) a 100 w o rd  abstract, (2) an essay o f app rox im ate ly  1500 words 
de ta iling  the proposed research, (3) a fu ll cu rricu lum  vita, and (4) tw o  letters o f recom m endation .
Inquiries and com pleted app lica tions should be addressed to Dr. Helen I. Safa, Center for Latin Am erican Studies, 
U n ivers ity  o f Florida, G ainesville , F lorida 32611-2037, Fax (904) 392-7682, Telephone (904) 392-0375. Fellows 
w ill be announced about A p ril 1, and w ill be expected to take up residence fo r the Fall semester by the end o f the 
fo llo w in g  August.
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Update: US Assistance
Compiled by Joseph Rogers
Overall US Assistance to Select Latin American Countries
US$ (000)
ECONOMIC* MILITARY COUNTER DRUG OTHER** TOTALS
BOLIVIA
1989 46,550 5,400 10,000 37,448 99,348
1990 57,634 39,726 15,700 35,616 148,676
1991 100,532 35,899 15,700 50,650 202,781
1992 127,561 25,900 15,700 51,117 220,278
1993 93,033 900 17,000 48,874 159,807
CHILE
1989 0 50 0 4,066 4,116
1990 0 50 0 1,863 1,913
1991 0 3,298 0 14,191 17,489
1992 0 351 0 1,303 3,390
1993 0 200 0 1,303 1,503
COLOMBIA
1989 5,000 8,100 10,000 2,565 25,665
1990 2,107 73,224 20,000 1,588 96,919
1991 24,250 49,593 20,000 749 94,592
1992 74,000 49,296 23,383 708 147,387
1993 26,379 2,200 25,000 699 54,258
EL SALVADOR
1989 247,288 81,400 0 54,791 383,479
1990 198,159 81,029 0 48,161 327,349
1991 182,178 66,989 0 40,215 289,382
1992 245,719 22,634 0 35,527 303,880
1993 198,055 12,400 0 32,302 242,757
MEXICO
1989 0 225 15,000 56,745 70,265
1990 0 249 15,000 5,043 20,292
1991 0 620 19,300 3,913 23,833
1992 0 565 20,000 7,044 27,609
1993 0 530 0 3,945 4,475
PERU
1989 16,498 3,020 10,500 32,610 62,628
1990 19,315 1,523 10,000 51,762 82,600
1991 68,827 24,474 19,000 87,286 199,587
1992 19,996 113 12,500 96779 129,388
1993 154,556 740 17,500 88,844 261,640
Source: Latin America and the Caribbean Selected Economic and Social Data, US Agency for International Development, May 1993. 
*Economic data includes Development Assistance and Economic Support Funds.
**Other category includes PL480(a), Inter-American Foundation, Trade Development Program and Peace Corps expenditures.
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Between Scylla and Charybdis
Carlos Parodi
n the past decade, US-Peru rela­
tions have been tested repeated­
ly by four issues: the em ergence 
of the Sendero Luminoso 
(Shining Path) guerrilla move­
ment; the proliferation of drug 
trafficking; Peru's foreign debt and 
economic crisis; and the consolida­
tion of democracy, especially hum an 
rights violations by security forces. 
Linkages among these issues were 
particularly evident in the co-evolu­
tion of narcotrafficking and the 
Sendero movement. More recently, 
the US governm ent suspended eco­
nomic aid to Peru until hum an 
rights and democracy issues were 
resolved in keeping with US govern­
m ent expectations.
Drugs and US Policy
During the Reagan/Bush years, 
Peru became a major target of US 
anti-drug policies. In the US 
counter-narcotics scheme, Peru fell 
on the supply side of the policy for­
mula as the world’s largest producer 
of coca leaves, the raw material for 
cocaine. While cocaine consump­
tion was addressed through educa­
tion campaigns (Nancy Reagan’s 
well publicized ‘Just Say N o” cam­
paign, for example), the supply side 
was targeted through coca eradica­
tion and interdiction campaigns. 
The fallout from this ineffective
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author, with James Malloy, of “Politics, 
Equity and Social Security Policy in 
Brazil, ” which appeared in Welfare, 
Poverty and Development in Latin 
America (Christopher Abel and Colin 
M. Lewis, Eds., London: Macmillan 
Press, 1993).
strategy—i.e., the Peruvian percep­
tion that the livelihood of thousands 
of peasant families was threatened— 
led international observers to note 
that US policy inadvertently 
strengthened support for Sendero. 
As Peruvian and US drug agents 
stepped up their eradication cam­
paigns, coca growers, mostly peas­
ants, fled into the arms of the guer­
rillas for protection.
With its powerful new social and 
economic base am ong the peasants, 
Sendero grew in membership and 
military power. Its geographic area 
of influence expanded and, in the 
perception of many Peruvians and 
foreign observers, came close to 
challenging the Peruvian military 
for control of the country.
Sendero’s growth forced the 
Peruvian military to change its strat­
egy. In 1989, the highest political 
and military authority of the U pper 
Huallaga valley, General Alberto 
Arciniega, opted not to attack the 
area’s peasants, but to seek alliances 
with them  in an effort to combat 
Sendero. This put Peruvian policy 
priorities into direct conflict with 
W ashington’s. For Peru, defeating 
Sendero had became the num ber 
one priority; for the US, the 
eradication of coca plantations 
came first. The actions of the 
Peruvian Army were seen as, at best, 
uncooperative. As a result, high- 
ranking US officials have repeatedly 
accused the Peruvian military of 
protecting traffickers.
Human Rights under Fujimori
Relations between Peru and the 
US took a new course with the elec­
tion of President Alberto Fujimori, 
who took a strong stance against US 
drug strategy and turned  down $34
million in US military aid for FY 
1991 to show his disapproval.
Instead of a strategy based on police 
and military repression, Fujimori 
stressed the need for crop substitu­
tion and alternative economic devel­
opm ent for peasant families. In 
response, the US and Peruvian gov­
ernm ents signed a new anti-drug 
pact in May 1991. Shortly after, how­
ever, the US Congress pu t military 
and economic aid on hold because 
of charges of hum an rights viola­
tions brought against Peruvian 
authorities.
George Bush was initially support­
ive of Fujimori. After the Peruvian’s 
official visit to Washington in 
Septem ber 1991, Bush praised 
Fujimori’s economic reforms and 
leadership in the fight against 
drugs, and urged Congress to 
release funds for economic and mil­
itary aid. Cordial relations, howev­
er, were short-lived. In January
1992, US anti-drug operations were 
put temporarily on hold after a US 
helicopter was shot down (apparent­
ly by Sendero guerrillas) killing 
three Americans and one Peruvian 
policeman. Then, at the 1992 San 
Antonio Summit, President Fujimori 
said that US plans for crop reduc­
tion, under current levels of fund­
ing, were unrealistic; and US anti­
drug strategy a failure in general.
President Fujimori’s decision on 
April 5, 1992 to suspend the 
Peruvian Constitution, close down 
Congress, and fire the country’s 
judges led to a clear confrontation 
with the US. Washington's reaction 
to the coup was immediate. In a 
special m eeting of the Organization 
of American States (OAS), Secretary 
of State Jam es Baker announced the 
suspension of all economic and mil-
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Sendero leader Abimael Guzman is in jail, but 
Peru ’s problems prove more difficult to capture
itary aid to Peru until democratic 
institutions were reestablished. 
Bilateral relations deteriorated fur­
ther after Peruvian Air Force fight­
ers shot down a US military trans­
port plane on April 24, leaving one 
US crewman missing and presumed 
dead.
OAS opposition to Fujimori had 
economic costs. Although the 
Peruvian government was following 
the orthodoxy of the International 
Monetary Fund, the OAS’s decision 
led to suspension of disbursements 
from the Interam erican 
Development Bank, restricting 
P eru’s access to foreign capital. 
International pressure forced 
Fujimori to make some concessions. 
Instead of a constitution written by 
notables and approved by plebiscite, 
Fujimori accepted the popular elec­
tion of a Constitutional Assembly, 
an idea he had initially dismissed.
The auto-golpe also attracted the 
attention of hum an rights organiza­
tions. Reports of several cases of 
hum an rights violations forced the 
US Congress to scrutinize the 
Fujimori governm ent and to delay 
the renewal of economic assistance. 
The November elections for the 
Constitutional Assembly, interna­
tionally certified, were applauded by 
Washington officials, although some 
raised concerns about Fujimori’s 
excessive influence in that body and 
the judiciary. The Bush adminis­
tration showed satisfaction with the 
fulfillment of P eru’s international 
financial obligations but continued 
to dem and an end to hum an rights 
violations.
W hen Bush left office in January 
1993, relations with the US were still 
tense despite international recogni­
tion of P eru’s economic and elec­
toral initiatives. Relations were still 
strained over the issue of the 
downed transport plane, as well as 
appropriate compensation for the 
US serviceman killed. The latter 
issue was finally settled in December
1993, when the Peruvian govern­
m ent agreed to pay $300,000 in 
compensation to the sole US vic­
tim ’s family.
Internal difficulties within 
Peru’s judiciary continue 
to foster clashes between 
the Fujimori government 
and the US.
Cooling Down
In this conflictual context, Bill 
C linton’s first policy statem ent came 
shortly after the release of a State 
D epartm ent hum an rights report.
He conditioned the participation of 
the US in the second “Support 
G roup” on an explicit com m itm ent 
by the Peruvian governm ent to the 
protection of hum an rights. Only 
after a public statem ent by P eru’s 
Constitutional Assembly and the 
Peruvian governm ent’s signing of 
an agreem ent with the International 
Red Cross was the financial contri­
bution of the US to the “Support 
G roup” approved. Nevertheless, the 
US expressed continued concern 
over unresolved cases of hum an 
rights violations, raising particular 
concern over the excesses of mili­
tary patrols and rural self-defense 
committees (rondas) with rural vil­
lagers and university students.
U nder Clinton, US-Peru relations
have been a mixture of consensus 
and conflict. The Peruvian govern­
m ent moved decisively on the eco­
nomic front to please the interna­
tional financial community. Foreign 
debt payments were timely, invest­
m ent laws were liberalized, and a 
privatization program  was unveiled. 
By year’s end, economic indicators 
pointed toward an economic recov­
ery. The weakening of Sendero, 
caused mainly by the October 1992 
capture of Abimael Guzman, was a 
crucial symbol of P eru’s recovery. 
Critics pointed out, however, that 
P eru’s economic program  was still 
missing two im portant components: 
a growing export sector and a social 
program  to address increasing levels 
of poverty.
Politically, municipal elections 
held in January 1993, along with the 
approval of a new constitution in an 
O ctober referendum , strengthened 
Peru 's international image. Still, 
reports of gross violations of hum an 
rights, expedient military trials for 
those charged with terrorism, and 
the authoritarian style of the 
Fujimori adm inistration inspired 
doubts about President Fujimori’s 
democratic credentials in 
Washington. A case that gained spe­
cial notoriety was the July 1992 
assassination of nine La Cantuta 
university students and a faculty 
m em ber by security forces. 
Investigations initiated by the 
Peruvian Congress the following 
year had to be dropped after army 
com m ander General Nicolas 
Herm oza sent tanks into the streets 
to show the Army’s disapproval. In 
May, Rodolfo Robles, the third high­
est-ranking general in the Peruvian 
Army, revealed the existence of an 
army death squad responsible for
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the assassinations of the La Cantuta 
students and other disappearances. 
This death squad, General Robles 
announced, was connected to the 
National Intelligence Service, and 
operated under the direction of 
intelligence advisor Vladimiro 
Montesinos.
Clinton and Peru
Although respect for hum an 
rights and democratic consolidation 
remain its central concern, the 
Clinton adm inistration is willing to 
cooperate with Peru. In the words 
of Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs and form er US 
Ambassador to Peru, Alexander 
Watson, “There remains legitimate 
concerns about P eru ’s vigilance in 
protecting hum an rights, but we can 
better advance our interests in 
hum an rights by being involved 
and active rather than by withdraw- 
ing.”
Some positive developments seem 
to indicate improvement in US-Peru 
relations. Campaigning for P eru’s 
May 1995 presidential elections has 
begun. The recently approved 
Constitution allows the incum bent 
Fujimori to run for a second term. 
Although the re-election clause is 
strongly contested (let us rem em ber 
the Constitution’s narrow margin of 
approval), candidates and parties 
have accepted the new political real­
ity and have either announced their 
participation in the electoral cam­
paign or are considering it. The 
press remains free. Im prisoned 
Sendero leaders are writing letters 
of reconciliation. With low inflation 
and a timid but hopeful economic 
recovery, the political-economic cli­
mate in Peru appears to have 
calmed.
Alexander Watson has played an 
im portant role in conveying these 
developments to the Clinton adm in­
istration and Congress, and thereby 
helped to create a new image of 
Peru in Washington. Perhaps it is 
his perception which convinced the
Clinton administration to request 
$150 million for Peru in the foreign 
aid proposal recently sent to 
Congress.
Despite the cooling-off period, 
the governments of Peru and the 
US could still easily find themselves 
on a collision course. The complex 
nature of their relations makes a 
confrontation almost inevitable. On 
the economic front, a foreign debt 
that exacts a heavy price on the 
Peruvian economy still generates 
plenty of potential for conflict.
More recently, P eru’s dependence 
on the financial support of the US 
for access to foreign markets and 
capital —crucial conditions for eco­
nomic recovery— adds to the level 
of tension.
On the political front, hum an 
rights conditions and internal diffi­
culties within P eru ’s judiciary will 
continue to foster clashes between 
the Fujimori governm ent and the 
US. The hum an rights record of 
Peru is inextricably linked to the 
arm ed confrontation between the 
army and the Sendero, and judging
from recent bombings and Sendero- 
Army skirmishes, the guerrillas, 
though weakened, have hardly been 
eliminated. The expected continua­
tion of this undeclared war will 
inevitably lead the governments of 
Peru and the US to conflicting per­
ceptions of what constitutes a 
hum an right violation.
Finally, US-Peru relations will con­
tinue to be tested by opposing views 
on drug policies. Washington recog­
nizes Lima’s political will to act 
against cocaine trafficking but also 
emphasizes that no significant 
progress is possible without an effec­
tive coca eradication campaign. The 
Peruvian government, in turn, 
accepts participation in interdiction 
operations but will not eradicate 
coca cultivation without providing 
alternatives for coca growers. 
Funding constraints in both govern­
ments do not bode well for the suc­
cess of alternative developm ent pro­
grams, which, in turn, adds to the 
tension and mitigates against 
improving bilateral relations in this 
area. ■
ler
A P u b l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  C a r i b b e a n  S t u d i e s  A s s o c i a t i o n
The Caribbean Studies Newsletter provides provocative feature articles, institution­
al news, book reviews, and conference as w e ll as w orking group news, across the 
horizon of Caribbean studies. This unique newsletter is a publication of the 
Caribbean Studies Association (CSA), and is published by the Latin American and 
Caribbean Center, as well as the O ffice o f International Education, Programs, and 
Activities, at Florida International University. The CSA is an independent profes­
sional organization, devoted to the prom otion of Caribbean Studies. The premier 
professional organization of its kind, the CSA has 950 members from around the 
world . Membership is open to anyone interested in sharing its objectives. For mem­
bership inform ation, contact Raquel Brailovsky-Cabrera, CSA Secretary-Treasurer, 
Inter-American University of Puerto Rico, San German, Puerto Rico 00683.
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C u b a n  R e s e a r c h  I n s t i t u t e
Florida International University
R O C K E F E L L E R  F O U N D A T I O N
R e s i d e n t  F e l l o w s h i p s  i n  t h e  H u m a n i t i e s
Island and Diaspora: Cuban Sovereignly, Identity, and Reconciliation in the 21st Century
For 1995-1998, the Cuban Research Institute (CRI) at Florida International University invites 
scholars of the humanities to explore the themes of sovereignty, identity, and reconciliation in 
Cuban intellectual and cultural traditions. The objective of the CRTs Rockefeller Fellowship 
Program is to advance understanding of these crucial and recurrent national themes at this juncture 
of Cuban history.
Eligibility. Applications from scholars with research experience on Cuba or the Cuban-American 
community are especially encouraged. Applications from scholars researching these issues in other 
societies are welcome and will be evaluated on their potential to provide a comparative perspective 
on the Cuban experience. Awards cannot be made for graduate study or dissertation research. 
Applicants need not be affiliated with an academic institution.
Terms. Awards will be made for residences of 3 months to one full academic year. The academic 
year at FIU extends from mid-August to early May. Applications for periods from 3 months to one 
semester are especially encouraged. Awards are based on a maximum of $35,000 for a fall academ­
ic year. Additional support may be provided for relocation expenses and health benefits. Fellows are 
encouraged to combine these stipends with sabbatical and other support.
Application. Complete applications are due February 1,1995. Awards will be announced by March 
15 for the following academic year. To request information and application materials contact:
R o c k e f e l le r  F o u n d a t io n  R e s id e n t  F ello w sh ips  in  t h e  H u m a n it ies  
Cuban Research Institute 
Florida International University 
University Park, D M  363 
Miami, Florida 33199 
Tel (305)348-1991/Fax (305)348-3593
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Hegemony and Partnership
Andes Franco
ssuming that Congress 
approves President 
C linton's “1994 National 
Drug Control Strategy” 
(hereafter “Strategy”) 
without m ajor changes, 
this adm inistration’s anti-drug poli­
cies promise to have a definite 
im pact on US-Colombia relations. 
First, C linton’s m oderate shift in 
emphasis from supply reduction to 
dem and reduction ($94.3 million 
for interdiction in FY 1995, down 
7.3% from FY 1994) will produce 
some relief in Bogota by partially 
transferring the drug war from the 
streets of Colombia to the US. His 
strategy recognizes that “dem and 
reduction—including drug treat­
m ent, prevention, and education— 
cannot succeed if drugs are readily 
available, [but it] rejects the false 
choice between dem and reduction 
and law enforcem ent efforts.” The 
FY 1995 request represents a $1 bil­
lion increase over last year, and 
provides additional resources for 
both supply reduction and dem and 
reduction programs.
Second, the Clinton strategy pro­
poses to “refocus in terd iction’s 
emphasis from the transit zones to 
the source countries,” which has 
led to US dem ands for m ore vigor­
ous interdiction by Colombian 
authorities prior to product transit. 
This has produced some anxiety in 
Santafe de Bogota, which views the
Andres Franco is a graduate of the 
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new interdiction strategy as a way 
for the Clinton adm inistration to 
blame the inevitable shortcomings 
of the drug war on Colombians.
Washington objected to 
the judiciary’s excessive 
independence, since it 
severely compromised 
Washington’s ally, the 
Colombian executive.
Hegemony
W ashington’s pressure on the 
Colombian judiciary to arrest and 
convict m em bers of the Cali cartel 
is a m ajor source of conflict 
between the two governments. The 
Colombian C onstituent Assembly’s 
1991 ban on extradition, com bined 
with the governm ent’s unwilling­
ness (despite pressure from the 
Drug Enforcem ent Agency) to 
employ military maneuvers against 
the essentially non-bellicose Cali 
cartel, forced the Clinton adminis­
tration to rely heavily on the prose­
cutorial zeal of the Colombian ju d i­
ciary as its main policy tool. As 
such, the scope and pace of judicial 
reform  in Colombia, m uch of it 
financed by US aid, creates some 
dilemmas for Clinton.
The first of these is the National 
Tribunals (formerly Courts of 
Public O rder) established in 1988 
to handle terrorism  and drug traf­
ficking, and later expanded to 
process political crimes. Conviction 
rates in these courts approach 70%
as opposed to 10% in the regular 
courts. The system, however, is 
under severe fire for ignoring 
Constitutional procedures, especial­
ly those involving the rights of 
defendants. The Clinton adminis­
tration has chosen to ignore the 
possibility that US aid is financing a 
judicial system which achieves high 
conviction rates by abridging the 
rights of defendants.
The second of W ashington’s 
problem  is the autonom y of the 
attorney general (fiscal general), a 
residual effect of the 1991 
Constitution, which increased the 
independence of the judiciary in 
general. The attorney general may 
express his legal opinions free of 
political consideration, and the 
vocal Gustavo de Greiff, appointed 
at the tail end of President Cesar 
Gaviria’s term , favored legalization 
to prevent traffickers from making 
obscene profits. He also said that 
the Cali cartel had succeeded in 
infiltrating Colombia’s judiciary 
and o ther institutions. Not only 
did W ashington oppose de Greiff’s 
opinions, it objected to the judicia­
ry’s excessive independence in gen­
eral, since it severely com prom ised 
the authority of W ashington’s ally, 
the Colombian executive. 
Presumably with the encourage­
m ent of US authorities, Gustavo de 
Greiff was “re tired ” in the early 
days of the new president, Ernesto 
Samper.
The third judicial reform  is the 
advent of plea bargaining in drug- 
related cases. The procedure falls 
u nder the jurisdiction of the attor­
ney general, and as expected, has 
produced strong reactions in 
Washington. The Clinton adminis­
tration considers plea bargaining
20 Hem isphere • Summer 1994
Reports: Colombia
Washington gets its wishes and regrets the consequences
an unhelpful shift in policy and 
took a dim view of the autonom y of 
the office of prosecutor general in 
this matter. The US D epartm ent of 
Justice argued that de Greiff was 
too lenient on the m em bers of the 
Cali cartel who proposed to surren­
der, tu rn  over some goods, and 
promise to leave the drug business 
in exchange for m inim um  sen­
tences, which may not be more 
than five years. De Greiff coun­
tered that to convict, Colom bia’s 
judiciary depends almost exclusive­
ly on the sharing of evidence with 
the US, and that the US has with­
held such evidence. US Attorney 
General Janet Reno responded in 
El Tiempo, arguing that the US is 
not w ithholding evidence and that 
it has cooperated in many cases, 
even when the results in various 
legal proceedings have no t been 
satisfactory for the United States.
Partnership
Apart from anti-drug initiatives, 
the Clinton adm inistration has 
been directly involved in three o th­
ers worth noting: the election of 
Cesar Gaviria as Secretary General 
of the Organization of American 
States (OAS); W ashington’s tacit 
support of Colom bia’s foreign poli­
cy towards Cuba; and the possibility 
of a Colombia-US free trade agree­
ment.
The OAS
The Clinton adm inistration real­
izes that the inter-American sys­
tem ’s laws, procedures and organi­
zations are m ore visible and 
arguably m ore effective than any 
time since 1945. With the purpose 
of revitalizing the OAS, and institu­
tionalizing aspects of US-Latin
America relations in a framework 
of democracy, free trade, and 
hum an rights, W ashington and 
Santafe de Bogota launched an 
unprecedented  hem ispheric cam­
paign to elect President Cesar 
Gaviria as Secretary General of the 
OAS. Gaviria’s domestic and for­
eign policies, and regional leader­
ship skills account for W ashington’s 
blessing.
Cuba
As a regional economic power 
(with Mexico and Venezuela), 
Colombia has tried to consolidate 
its political sway in the Caribbean. 
W hen both Venezuela and Mexico 
were forced to shift attention from 
foreign policy to domestic turmoil, 
Colombia acquired unprecedented 
political influence in the 
Caribbean. Unable to leave Cuba 
out of any Caribbean foreign policy 
initiative, Colombia proposed a 
free trade agreem ent with the 
English-speaking Caribbean coun­
tries, approaching nations such as 
Jam aica and reestablishing diplo­
matic relations with Cuba. The US 
tacitly supported Gaviria’s meetings 
with Fidel Castro, social and cultur­
al cooperation agreem ents, and 
economic transactions with Cuba. 
Colom bia’s foreign policy did not 
produce a protest or a condem na­
tion from Washington, nor did it 
in terfere with Gaviria’s candidacy 
to the OAS.
CUFTA
CUFTA is the ultim ate objective 
of Colom bia’s foreign economic 
policy, and President Clinton has 
adm itted that Colombia is an allur­
ing candidate to jo in  NAFTA in the 
near future in spite of the drug
industry. If CUFTA is instituted, it 
would become a m ore perm anent, 
aggressive and comprehensive 
extension of W ashington’s unilater­
al Andean Trade Preference Act 
(ATPA). Approved by Congress in 
1991 to reward the Andean coun­
tries for their efforts in the drug 
war, the ATPA reduced tariff barri­
ers to many Colombian products 
and established relatively low rules 
of origin (35%), but m aintained 
tariff barriers to sensitive items 
such as textiles, apparel, footwear 
and sugar, and non-tariff barriers 
such as sanitary and ecological con­
trols, anti-dum ping and com pen­
satory rights, and additional cus­
tom procedures linked to drug-traf­
ficking. According to Colombian 
governm ent statistics 18.5% of 
Colombian 1990 exports to the US 
were subject to non-tariff barriers, 
and over 50% of these were applied 
to agricultural products (mainly 
flowers), processed food (sugar and 
shrim p), textiles, apparel, and 
leather manufactures.
Cooperation
Although US-Colombian relations 
under Clinton have established 
some channels for cooperation, 
W ashington’s obsession with the 
prosecution of the m embers of the 
Cali cartel makes Colombia’s for­
eign policy dependent and condi­
tional upon total compliance with 
US policy and objectives in the 
drug war. The authority of the 
Colombian state appears to be as 
hostage to US imperatives as to 
narcoviolence, and in spite of 
Colombia’s political and economic 
achievements, Clinton retains many 
features of the Reagan and Bush 
anti-drug policies. ■
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Chile Forecast
Alicia Frohman
In a flurry of economic, politi­cal, social, and cultural exchanges, Chilean-US rela­tions have doubtlessly intensi­fied in the 1990s. Areas of con­currence and cooperation 
include democracy, hum an rights, 
nuclear non-proliferation, the politi­
cal resolution of regional conflicts, 
and the convergence of market 
economies with free trade.
All Lined Up
A couple of years ago, form er 
interior minister Alejandro Foxley 
told an interviewer that the prob­
lems in Chile-US relations resem­
bled those between the US and 
France or Germany; that is, that 
they consisted fundamentally of 
trade matters. At the time, the 
statem ent seemed exaggerated. 
However, a review of 1990-94 bilater­
al issues basically confirms the truth 
of Foxley’s assertion. Many of these 
issues (investment, intellectual prop­
erty, the environment, air traffic, 
agriculture, textiles) await resolu­
tion, pending inclusion in negotia­
tions toward a free-trade agreem ent 
(FTA). The specter of this future 
negotiation, which has not yet mate­
rialized because of bureaucratic tie- 
ups and uncertainties in 
Washington, has hovered over 
Chile-US relations for four years, 
preventing substantial advances on 
any other matters.
Most of the knots in bilateral rela­
tions during the last days of the
Alicia Frohman is a research associate at 
the Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales in Santiago de Chile.
Pinochet governm ent began to 
unwind with Chile’s return  to demo­
cratic rule in 1990. Chile regained 
the benefits of the General System 
of Preferences, US military arms 
sales became possible once again, 
and US investment in Chile 
re turned  to the fold of OPIC 
(Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation). Such initiatives were 
the direct result of the return  to 
democracy, improvements in hum an 
rights and labor issues, as well as the 
efforts of the Aylwin government to 
resolve the m urders of O rlando 
Letelier and Ronnie Moffit. In 
1976, a hit squad dispatched by 
Chilean intelligence killed the two 
(a Chilean and a US citizen, respec­
tively), in Washington, DC.
President Bush’s Enterprise for 
the Americas Initiative, particularly 
its hemispheric free-trade compo­
nent, received an early and enthusi­
astic reception in Chile. 
Democratization and economic 
reform  seemed to make Chile an 
obvious partner to en ter free trade 
negotiations soon. Since then, most 
of the bilateral agenda has been 
viewed with an eye toward an even­
tual free trade agreement. While 
Washington’s proposals for hem i­
spheric-wide trade integration lan­
guished in favor of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the insistence of Chilean 
authorities helped keep alive the 
idea of a broader integration 
scheme. Washington gave assur­
ances and reiterated its interest in 
negotiating with Chile and eventual­
ly o ther Latin American countries, 
but postponed all o ther initiatives 
until after NAFTA approval. Latin 
American governments, particularly 
Chile’s, confronted the then-recent-
ly installed Clinton administration, 
dem anding the free trade plan 
promised on many different occa­
sions by successive US administra­
tions. Despite innum erable declara­
tions of good intentions, in mid-
1994, there were no formal negotia­
tions. The United States has not 
even defined with whom it intends 
to negotiate, and whether the cho­
sen path will be NAFTA accession or 
bilateral negotiations.
Clinton and Chile
C linton’s policy toward Chile and 
delays in starting free-trade negotia­
tions are a good example of how, 
despite the good will of all parties 
and a lack of contentious issues, 
bureaucratic tie-ups persist when 
there are no strong interest groups 
intent upon eliminating them. The 
result is that for Chile, a small coun­
try of relative economic insignifi­
cance to the US, inertia turns out to 
be m ore powerful than political 
commitment.
In Latin America, many believed 
that a Democratic administration 
would be more protectionist than its 
Republican predecessors. In dis­
course, at least, this has not been 
the case. The Clinton administra­
tion has confirmed its com m itm ent 
to the democratic political process, 
free trade, and open markets. 
Gambling its prestige and political 
capital to get NAFTA approval con­
stitutes an initial pass at commercial 
integration south of the Rio 
Grande. A certain haziness regard­
ing the next steps remains. 
Washington has yet to cem ent its 
four-year old offer to create a hemi­
spheric free trade area, for which 
Chile would be a decidedly obvious 
candidate.
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Santiago wants to be the next player in the FTA game
Chilean Foreign Trade, 1992
Percentage o f Total Exports Im ports
Latin America 17 25
N orth America 17 22
European Community 29 19
Asia 31 19
O ther 6 15
Source: Banco Central de Chile, Boletines Mensuales
Accession
Despite the considerable geo­
graphic diversification of Chilean 
export destinations, the US remains 
Chile’s main trading partner, 
accounting for approximately 20% 
of all trade flows. This situation 
explains both Chile’s interest in 
reaching an agreem ent with the US, 
and puts it into comparative per­
spective, since Chilean trade inter­
ests in o ther places (Latin America, 
the European Community, Asia), 
are also significant.
An FTA or NAFTA accession is an 
interesting possibility for a num ber 
of reasons:
• to serve as a guarantee of the sta­
bility and credibility of the Chilean 
economy;
• to create the dispute settlement 
mechanisms that a small country 
like Chile needs;
• to protect Chile from arbitrary US 
trade measures or increased protec­
tionism; and
• to increase exports of processed 
Chilean goods by eliminating tariff 
escalation in the US.
The negotiation of a trade agree­
m ent with the US is com plem entary 
to, no t exclusive of, Chile’s activist 
policy of open markets worldwide. 
Chile is aware that free trade negoti­
ations with the US would have 
domestic as well as international 
costs, but is also convinced that in 
the medium  run, the benefits out­
weigh the adverse effects.
As for the US, the incentives to 
negotiate with Chile are almost 
exclusively political. Chile is its 36th 
largest trading partner, representing 
less than 1% of US foreign trade. 
However, to enter negotiations 
would be a signal that the US is in 
fact developing a coherent policy
toward Latin America that includes 
rewarding — at least symbolically — 
democratic and economic reforms. 
There are no foreseeable insur­
m ountable obstacles in the negotia­
tions, and it seems obvious that an 
open m arket like Chile’s would not 
be a problem  for the US. The per­
ception that Chile is only the first of 
many to gain NAFTA accession, 
however, could become a threat to 
those fearing com petition from the 
larger Latin American countries. At 
the same time, its relatively small 
economy also means that there is no 
great incentive to negotiate.
Pending issues
Most bilateral issues awaiting reso­
lution will probably be sidelined to 
give free reign to trade negotiations. 
Certain themes stand out, like intel­
lectual property protection, foreign 
investment protection and taxation, 
environmental protection, and 
international air traffic. Chile has 
recently passed legislation on all of 
these topics, no t entirely to the satis­
faction of the US.
O n the subject of counter-nar- 
cotics, the US has raised three con­
cerns. In descending order, they 
are money laundering, export con­
trols on input chemicals to cocaine 
producing countries, and drug traf­
ficking (although Chile is not cur­
rently considered a high risk coun­
try). US authorities have indicated 
that even these subjects could be 
peripheral to free-trade negotia­
tions. Chile is processing legislation 
on controlled substances and is 
interested in greater cooperation 
with Washington on anti-drug initia­
tives, conditioned on US respect for 
sovereignty.
Many of these matters will pro­
ceed in a relatively expeditious m an­
ner once the Clinton administration 
overcomes its inertia on Latin 
America and unclogs the hem i­
spheric free trade negotiations.
This will not magically resolve all 
the problems of the hem isphere, 
but it will help revitalize the 
region’s economies. Perhaps as 
never before, in this less ideological 
and more pragmatic era, Latin 
America will not only endure, but 
also derive benefits from the hege­
monic proximity of the United 
States. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Walmart in the Southern Cone
According to a report in 
A rgentina’s Trade and Investment 
Neius, Walmart plans to open two 
“supercenters,” —oversized stores 
that sell retail food and m erchan­
dise—and two Sam’s Club m em ber­
ship warehouses in Buenos Aires in
1995. Walmart, the US’s largest 
retailer, already has a vast presence 
throughout Mexico.
Out but Not Down
Rumors of the im m inent departure 
of Colombia’s controversial 
Attorney General (fiscal general de la 
nacion) Gustavo de Greiff, had been 
circulating in Bogota even before 
President Ernesto Samper was 
sworn into office on August 7. De 
Greiff became persona non grata 
after suggesting that the legaliza­
tion of drugs should be studied, but 
since leaving office he has become 
a candidate for nearly every prom i­
nen t post available. According to 
Semana, de Greiff is being consid­
ered for the post of Colombian 
ambassador to the Court of St. 
James.
Marital Woes, Martial Law
W hen Susana Higuchi, the wife of 
Peruvian President Alberto 
Fujimori, announced her intention 
to challenge a law forbidding presi­
dential spouses from seeking high 
office, reaction from the chief exec­
utive was swift. H er husband
Edited by Eduardo A. Gamarra 
and Tricia Juhn
promptly fired her as first lady, 
deployed an arm ed contingent to 
secure her office, and installed iron 
bars to prevent Ms. Higuchi from 
re-entering it. Asked if the incident 
m eant conjugal trouble, both 
Fujimoris called it “merely a differ­
ence in ideas.”
Brazil Tops Mexico
According to International Data 
C orporation’s (IDC) Latin America 
Personal Computer Markets, 1994, 
regional shipments of personal 
com puters to Latin America 
increased 22% from 1992-1993.
IDC projects that unit shipments of 
PCs will grow at a com pound annu­
al rate of 19.5% over five years 
(1993-1998). Total PC sales in 
Latin America, estimated last year 
at m ore than US$2.4 billion, are 
projected to double over the same 
period. In 1993, Brazil’s PC market 
grew by m ore than 34%, or 480,000 
units, making it the region’s largest 
national m arket for PC sales. 
Mexico still commands the highest 
m arket value, however. Latin 
American Personal Computer Markets,
1994 is a six-country study (Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, 
Colombia) based on m onths of 
field research and interviews. It 
can be purchased by contacting 
Eric Prothero, IDC’s Manager of 
Latin American Research, at 415- 
962-6463.
Going Somewhere?
Any travel plans to Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the near 
future may warrant some modifica­
tion. In late August, following 
heavy pressure from consum er
groups, the US D epartm ent of 
Transportation released the names 
of nine countries identified as hav­
ing inadequate governm ent super­
vision of air safety. Airlines from 
Belize, the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay are barred  from land­
ing at US airports. Bolivia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and the Dutch 
Antilles were granted conditional 
approval only.
A Monument to Corruption
On Septem ber 3, 1994, Argentine 
president Carlos Menem inaugurat­
ed the first of the Yacyreta hydro­
electric dam ’s twenty turbines. 
Yacyreta, which Menem once 
described as A rgentina’s “m onu­
m ent to corrup tion ,” is running 
over six times the initial budget and 
remains unfinished after eleven 
years of construction.
Coca Is It
Once outspoken opponents of US 
counternarcotics policies in Bolivia, 
Vice President Victor Hugo 
Cardenas, the first Aymara to reach 
high office, and Foreign Minister 
Antonio Aranibar of the leftist 
Movimiento Bolivia Libre have found 
themselves in a difficult position 
lately. In September, thousands of 
peasants from the coca growing 
regions of the country— mainly 
indigenous people—m arched on La 
Paz dem anding that the govern­
m ent respect their right to grow 
coca and that security agencies be 
held responsible for alleged hum an 
rights violations in the Chapare 
Valley. The governm ent was unsuc­
cessful in disbanding the m archers
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and was forced to negotiate in 
order to forestall a violent con­
frontations with security forces. As 
high ranking governm ent officials, 
Cardenas and Aranibar have been 
forced to defend the official policy 
of ordering the army into coca 
growing regions and supporting the 
eradication of the bush.
24-Hour News Boom
Once the only 24-hour news show 
in Latin America, CNN faces stiff 
com petition these days. SUR pro­
vides a ‘round-the-clock relay of 
local newscasts from Argentina to 
Mexico. The regional headquarters 
of both ECO (Mexico) and NBC are 
now in Miami. Telenoticias is the new 
kid on the block; a consortium  of 
Miami-based Telemundo Group Inc., 
Reuters, Artear (A rgentina), Antena 
3 International (Spain), and 
Productora y Comertializadora de 
Television (M exico). Telenoticias 
plans to be up in time for the 
Summit of the Americas, and will 
broadcast to Spain, Latin America, 
and a few select regions of the 
United States.
Fighting Corruption
South American presidents of late 
have had a very difficult time keep­
ing the lid on corruption scandals. 
Three form er presidents Fernando 
Collor de Mello (Brazil), Alan 
Garcia (Peru) and Jaim e Paz 
Zamora (Bolivia) have seen their 
political careers cut short by allega­
tions of embezzlement and connec­
tions to drug cartels. Form er presi­
dent Carlos Andres Perez 
(Venezuela) has been fighting for 
his political life, also against corrup­
tion charges. Ecuadoran president 
Sixto Duran Ballen, has had to 
defend him self from accusations of 
nepotism. Fighting corruption  has 
become fashionable in the region. 
Form er governm ent officials from 
every country have been eagerly 
signing up as members of 
Transparency International, an 
international agency m odeled on 
Amnesty International, to m onitor 
charges of corruption in Latin 
America and elsewhere.
No Surprises Here
According to the Economic 
Commission for Latin America 
(ECIA/CEPAL), Latin America as a 
region has grown at a m oderate 
three percent rate for the past four 
years, kept inflation in check, but 
has been incapable of dealing with 
unem ploym ent. Peru leads the 
region with eight percent growth 
followed by A rgentina at six, and 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Costa 
Rica at about four percent. The 
news is less optimistic about 
Venezuela, Haiti, and Honduras, 
whose gross domestic products are 
expected to fall in 1994.
Below the Belt
Form er superflyweight world cham­
pion, Colombian Baby Sugar Rojas, 
took a low blow from the US 
Customs at Miami International 
Airport last September.
Encouraged by the re tu rn  of so 
many aging boxers, Rojas decided 
to travel to Miami to begin training 
for a possible comeback. His plans 
were postponed, however, when 
Customs inspectors held him for 
hours on suspicion of having swal­
lowed several bags of cocaine. After 
searching his bags he was hand­
cuffed and taken to Jackson 
Memorial Hospital for x-rays, which 
confirm ed his innocence. Rojas’s 
story, broadcast by Radio Caracol, 
struck a familiar chord with several 
Colombian nationals who claimed 
similar treatm ent by Customs 
inspectors at the Miami 
International airport. Customs offi­
cials defend their actions and claim 
a “low” 25 percent rate of error.
Gallup Arrives in Miami
Citing quick access to growing 
dem and in Latin America, the 
international firm of Gallup 
America Latina recently moved its 
regional headquarters to Miami.
The public opinion pollster arrived 
in August, and is expected to play a 
m ajor forecasting role in several 
upcom ing elections. The firm ’s 
regional president is Gabriel 
Gonzalez Molina. Requests for 
inform ation can be faxed to (305) 
594-9272.
Detective Story
Kroll Associates Inc., the world’s 
largest corporate investigative firm, 
has also moved its regional head­
quarters to Miami. Kroll’s investiga­
tors are reputed to have tracked 
down the hidden fortune of Jean 
Claude Duvalier, uncovered the link 
between (form er Peruvian presi­
dent) Alan Garcia and BCCI, and 
recovered monies smuggled out of 
Brazil by an aide to (ousted presi­
dent) Fernando Collor de Mello. 
The firm has expanded into resolv­
ing kidnappings and identifying the 
sources of illicit fortunes. ■
H emisphere • Summer 1994 25
F E A T  
“Continuismo” or Convergence?
Johanna Mendelson Forman
Foreign policy will play almost no role in the 1996 re-election campaign. A strong economy, low infla­tion, and delivering on domestic campaign promis­
es like health care will determ ine 
the success of the country’s first 
Democratic administration in twelve 
years. Barring military invasion or 
coup, Latin America and the 
Caribbean fall off the radar screen 
to all but the most fervent junkies of 
hemispheric affairs. Fortunately for 
Clinton, the region, save Haiti and 
Cuba, has never been so democratic.
Gnawing problems of hum an 
rights violations in Haiti, Colombia, 
Peru, and Guatemala, and the 
unabated narcotics trade persist, but 
even the more skeptical pundits, 
while questioning the merits of a 
“new partnership”, adm it that 
W ashington’s relationship with its 
Latin American neighbors is no 
longer business as usual (See 
Abraham Lowenthal, “Latin 
America: Ready for Partnership?” 
Foreign Affairs, v72, n l  (1993), pp. 
74-92). Over the long term, howev­
er, the implications for a less activist 
role may be more troublesome.
Democracy and Human Rights
At mid-term, what has the Clinton 
administration done to carve out its 
own policy niche in the hemisphere? 
In one of his first presidential for-
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eign policy addresses, Clinton stated 
that “our security and prosperity will 
be greatly affected in the years 
ahead by how many of these nations 
can become and stay democracies.” 
The administration etched out a tri­
partite policy embracing democracy 
and respect for hum an rights, 
regional security, and free trade as 
the bases on which the United 
States will engage other nations: 
democratization is the ticket to 
northern  markets. In just under 
two years, foreign policy terminolo-
Lessoris learned take on 
new meaning in a world 
where democracy is no 
longer pitted against 
a communist enemy.
gy has shifted from such cold war 
concepts as “threats” and “wars 
against drugs” to "partnership”, 
“reform ”, “symmetry”, “good gover­
nance”, and a “substantive symme­
try” that Richard Feinberg, Special 
Assistant to the President at the 
National Security Council, defines 
as “a similar agenda rooted in 
the [ir] common participation in the 
one-worlcl economy.” Early on, for­
m er Deputy Secretary of State 
Clifton W harton suggested 
“Too often in our history, we have 
turned our attention to Latin 
America in times of crisis, and we 
have turned  our back when the cri­
sis passes. That is short-sighted and 
self-defeating. This Administration 
will not make that mistake.
President Clinton is committed to
forging a true partnership of the 
Americas-a Western Hemisphere 
community of democracies—to 
strengthen democratic institutions, 
to defend hum an rights, to fight for 
social justice, to support economic 
reform  and free markets, and to 
protect the environment. And let 
there be no doubt: We will build a 
hem isphere of free trade.”
The Bush Legacy
Also evident at mid-term is an ele­
m ent of “continuism o,” most obvi­
ously regarding US immigration 
policy toward Haiti and the Bush 
counternarcotics strategy (although 
Congress is no longer willing to 
fund eradication programs with 
Cadillac price tags) and the incor­
poration of sustainable develop­
ment, a concept m ore friendly to 
such constituencies as environm en­
tal groups and other non-govern- 
m ental organizations (NGOs).
A nother manifestation of con­
tinuismo is the renewed focus on 
hum an rights, a throwback to the 
Carter years. Many foreign policy 
makers, from the Secretary of State 
down, served under President 
Carter, and lessons learned then 
take on new m eaning in a world 
where democracy is no longer pit­
ted against a communist enemy. A 
pragmatic approach to hum an 
rights has given the subject more 
consistent policy guidance. 
Moreover, C linton’s messengers are 
people who have earned high credi­
bility as advocates. They include a 
form er ACLU legislative counsel, 
Assistant Secretary of State for 
Hum an Rights and Hum anitarian 
Affairs, John  Shattuck, and a form er 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
H um an Rights, Mark Schneider,
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who is currently the Assistant 
Administrator for Latin America 
and the Caribbean at the Agency 
for International Development.
Haiti
Nowhere more than in Haiti has 
Clinton failed. Clinton, the candi­
date, campaigned against the Bush 
adm inistration’s policy of forced 
repatriation of boat people.
Clinton, the president, immediately 
did an about-face on this policy 
once the realities of a massive influx 
of indigent Haitians hit the con­
sciousness of the US electorate.
Haiti was an opportunity to under- 
gircl democracy, economic security, 
and respect for hum an rights by 
unilateral action. Now the options 
are limited and one possible out­
come, a multilateral occupation 
gone awry, could force our new part­
nership with the region to unravel. 
Haiti will certainly test the ability of 
the US to determ ine the criteria for 
the use of force to restore democra­
cy and oust coupmakers.
Counternarcotics
In this area, m ore is less. The 
Andean Initiative of the Bush 
administration, the war on drugs 
enshrined in the Declaration of San 
Antonio, has become only one of 
the 'new determ inants of global 
security.’ After peacekeeping, 
nuclear non-proliferation and sus­
tainable development, and ahead of 
terrorism, the international drug 
trade ranks am ong the new post­
cold war security threats, at least 
according to US State D epartm ent 
Counselor Tim Wirth. The implica­
tions of this for regional security are 
troublesome, given the undue 
emphasis Bush allowed the
D epartm ent of Defense to place on 
the drug war as a key regional mili­
tary mission. While the Clinton 
adm inistration’s approach to this 
subject is more complex, there is 
m uch room  for creativity. Ironically, 
one of the most successful of alter­
native development products to 
em erge as a replacem ent to coca 
has been tobacco, a situation that 
could pit the anti-smoking, anti­
tobacco Clinton against the forces 
of counternarcotics policy.
A multilateral occupation 
gone awry in Haiti could 
force our new partnership 
ufith the region to unravel.
NAFTA
Having pledged his support for 
NAFTA passage late in the presiden­
tial campaign, the Clinton White 
House geared up for a down-to-the- 
finish-line battle for ratification. 
NAFTA cost Clinton lots of political 
capital with traditional Democratic 
allies in labor. Much to the credit 
of Vice President A1 Gore, the pub­
lic debate over NAFTA probably 
constituted Latin America’s fifteen 
minutes of fame. Clinton made 
NAFTA into a political test, not only 
of his muscle in Congress, but also 
his ability to translate domestic con­
cerns into substantive foreign policy. 
For Latin Americans, NAFTA's ratifi­
cation reinforced the Clinton 
adm inistration’s com m itm ent to 
support progress in expanding free 
trade and reducing tariffs, while 
also prom oting regional integration.
At the April inauguration of 
President Eduardo Frei of Chile, it 
was no coincidence that United 
States Trade Commissioner, 
Ambassador Mickey Kantor, led the 
US delegation to Santiago. The sig­
nals for fast-track trade treaties are 
sounding loud and clear. Clinton 
may very well expand the NAFTA to 
the Southern Cone before the end 
of 1994. This is no longer the 
empty rhetoric of the Bush adminis­
tration’s Enterprise for the 
America’s initiative, but rather the 
pragmatic push of a new approach 
to regional development.
New Actors and New Visions
The personnel issue within the new 
adm inistration’s Latin America shop 
started with a trem endous battle 
which brought Cuba to the fore. 
Clinton nom inated Mario Baeza, a 
Cuban-American lawyer from New 
York as Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs. For 
weeks the new administration faced 
the wrath of the Cuban-American 
lobby, as it cranked up its political 
m achine to show a young president 
who really ran the show in this area. 
The adm inistration withdrew Baeza, 
as it seemed that no Hispanic- 
American, or even a liberal with aca­
demic credentials, could m eet the 
test of the Cuban-American 
National Foundation. In the end, 
cold warriors accepted Alexander F. 
Watson as a compromise candidate. 
A skilled career diplomat, Watson 
has helped to bridge the gap 
between continuismo and conver­
gence.
Part of the adm inistration’s Latin 
American policy comes from
Convergence and Community: The 
Americas in 1993, a report of the
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Inter-American Dialogue produced 
m onths before the inauguration.
Its language became the m antra 
of State D epartm ent and National 
Security Council spokespeople as 
they articulated the new vision of 
the US-Latin America relationship.
In a lofty series of policy recom m en­
dations, the report envisioned its 
three main areas of interest to cre­
ate a guiding light for the president­
elect by pushing hemispheric eco­
nomic integration, the collective 
defense of democracy, and poverty 
alleviation as the principle objec­
tives of a new policy dialogue with 
regional leaders. The multilateral 
nature of the proposals reflected 
the approach of many of the more 
liberal scholars and policy makers 
who had developed these themes in 
publications and research of their 
own. The new administration also 
drew some of its key personnel from 
the Dialogue’s staff and board, most 
notably form er Dialogue president 
Richard E. Feinberg, and Sally 
Shelton, now the new Assistant 
Administrator of USAID’s Global 
Bureau.
O ther personnel choices include 
Arturo Valenzuela, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs, who manages 
democracy and Mexican issues. 
Valenzuela, an accomplished schol­
ar of democratic transitions, is 
invaluable to the US government in 
the face of the ongoing Mexican 
drama. The January uprising in 
Chiapas and the March m urder of 
the PRI's presidential candidate,
Luis Donaldo Colosio, com bined 
with expanding pressures for 
authentic pluralism, make a cool 
head and an understanding of polit­
ical change critical at this juncture.
Personnel changes at the 
Organization of American States 
also reflect the new multilateralism. 
The OAS has been repeatedly tested 
as a new tool in regional diplomacy. 
Beginning in the Bush administra­
tion, and even more so under
C linton’s lead, the OAS has been 
given a mission which will make it 
an ever more im portant tool in our 
options. The selection of H arriet 
Babbitt as US Ambassador provided 
a signal of the adm inistration’s 
desire to put political muscle 
behind its appointm ent. An attor­
ney, Babbitt has translated an inter­
est in the region and friendship 
with the Clintons into an advantage 
for the institution. US support of 
Colombian President Cesar Gaviria 
over Costa Rica’s form er foreign 
minister Bernard Niehaus marked a 
turning point in the US approach to 
OAS leadership, signaling a new 
com m itm ent to strong hemispheric 
leadership at a once m oribund orga­
nization. During attempts to under­
mine freely elected governments,
Whether an unimperial 
president can lead the way 
both at home and abroad 
will be tested by the stability 
of our hemisphere.
such as the autogolpe in Peru, the 
Serranazo in Guatemala and the 
rum ors of a restive military in 
Venezuela, the Clinton administra­
tion used the OAS to signal that such 
actions can no longer be tolerated in 
a “community of democracies.”
Old Issues, New Challenges
Central America, the festering 
wound of US foreign policy during 
the Reagan years, is healing, thanks 
to the benign neglect of the Bush 
administration, the end of east-west 
rivalries, and continuing commit­
m ent from a Democratic president 
to close this sad chapter of hem i­
spheric relations. Foreign aid levels 
are declining but target Salvador 
peace accords and support for 
Guatemalan negotiations. Despite 
elections, Nicaragua remains a
diplomatic nightmare because of 
continuing political factionalism 
and predom inance of Sandinistas 
in the state security apparatus. In 
Panama, the presidential assump­
tion by Manuel Noriega’s political 
heirs presents the Clinton adminis­
tration with a test of our commit­
m ent to the process.
W hat is different about C linton’s 
approach to the region? The 
changes are subtle: a distinct 
change in the tone and feel of for­
eign policy; a new role for NGOs in 
the decision-making process.
Hum an rights policy is discussed 
with mutual respect rather than 
mutual hostility. C linton’s trials will 
ultimately center on a few issues: 
our ability to remain cool as events 
unfold in Mexico, preparing a post- 
Cold War Cuba policy constrained 
by domestic politics, and developing 
a new relationship with the region’s 
military which bolsters civilian con­
trol without jeopardizing regional 
security.
C linton’s reaction to the political 
instability in Mexico above all 
dem onstrated respect for the 
Salinas government, dramatically 
underscored when minutes after the 
March assassination of PRI (Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional) presi­
dential candidate Luis Donaldo 
Colosio, Clinton ordered the 
Treasury D epartm ent to provide an 
emergency short term  loan guaran­
tee to support the peso to prevent 
disruption of Mexican financial 
markets. Post-cold war relations 
with Cuba have been more trouble­
some. Even a hint of a shift in poli­
cy, such as the recent overturning of 
the US trade embargo toward 
Vietnam, churned up the waters in 
the Cuban American community, 
though the fissures in solidarity are 
becoming more apparent.
How Clinton directs the missions 
of the US military toward the hem i­
sphere will indicate whether we 
approach our neighbors as partner 
or hegemon. W hether we aid and
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abet Latin American militaries in 
their quest for new missions will cer­
tainly be influenced by US 
approaches to counternarcotics ini­
tiatives and Latin American enthusi­
asm for United Nations peacekeep­
ing operations. The removal of the 
Southern Command from Panama 
will be the final symbol of US mili­
tary dom ination yielding to the 
more im portant trading partnership 
that will shape US-Latin American 
relations well into the 21st century.
The Summit of the Americas, 
scheduled for December 9-10, 1994 
in Miami, will m irror the ones 
already familiar to those following 
the adm inistration’s “newspeak”: 
good governance, democracy and 
free trade. An im portant departure 
of this administration is its willing­
ness to address corruption, a propi­
tious decision since, following the 
departures of Carlos Andres Perez 
and Fernando Collor, Latin 
American governments appear to 
be more sensitive to dem ands for 
clean government.
A convergence of interests 
between the US and Latin America 
will ultimately help distinguish this 
adm inistration’s approach to the 
region. Its success will be measured 
by the continued proliferation of 
elected democratic governments, 
the accession of additional members 
into NAFTA, and the improved 
enfranchisem ent of Latin 
Americans in their own lands. This 
will take extraordinary commit­
ment, not only from the US but also 
from the international financial 
institutions, to develop programs 
that address the alleviation of 
extrem e poverty, while simultane­
ously prom oting structural reform. 
W hether an unim perial president 
can lead the way both at hom e and 
abroad will be tested by the stability 
of our hem isphere, both in econom ­
ics and politics. Certainly, C linton’s 
ability to succeed in the hem isphere 
begins with his ability to remain a 
leader at home. ■
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All For One. One For All
Ronald W. Cox
The end of the Cold War and the occurrence of recessions in Japan and the European Community (EC) provide the context for understanding the 
Clinton Administration’s economic 
policies in Latin America. Like 
President Bush, Clinton is looking 
toward the Western Hemisphere to 
bolster the competitive position of 
the US in the global economy. Both 
administrations placed the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) at the center of their 
Latin American agenda.
With NAFTA as the base, the 
Clinton team is drafting a plan to 
create a Western Hem isphere free- 
trade zone, with Chile in tended as 
the next member. The plan, which 
has a timetable of 10-15 years, seeks 
to lower trade barriers and disman­
tle governmental regulations block­
ing foreign investment and trade in 
the hemisphere. One possible sce­
nario for the trade plan is for the 
US to negotiate one at a time with 
each prospective m em ber of the 
free-trade zone. A nother is for the 
administration to organize the trade 
pact “cluster by cluster,” with region­
al free-trade groups such as 
Mercosur, which consists of Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, 
negotiating to enter all at once in 
exchange for eliminating trade and 
investment restrictions.
Ronald W. Cox is assistant professor of 
political science at Florida International 
University. His most recent luork is 
Power and Profits: US Policy in 
Central America, University of 
Kentucky Press, 1994.
In launching its hemispheric free- 
trade zone, the Clinton administra­
tion hopes to build on its percep­
tion of favorable recent trends.
First, with lower tariffs, US exports 
to Latin America rose 27 percent in 
1992. Second, Latin America and 
Europe were the only two regions of 
the world where the US had trade 
surpluses last year. These develop­
ments have em erged on the heels of 
the difficult conditions that Latin 
American countries faced in the 
1980s, when capital and resources 
flowed outward from the region, 
resulting in negative economic 
growth rates.
Clinton’s policy statements 
focus on trade and 
investment to the 
exclusion of any discussion 
on the increasing 
maldistribution of 
wealth in the region.
In fact, the economic circum­
stances of the 1980s made Latin 
American governments—increasing­
ly dom inated by a new group of 
m arket-oriented economists and 
finance ministers—more willing to 
proceed with severe austerity mea­
sures to pay off their debts. What 
some have called the “lost decade of 
the 1980s” led to moves to liberalize 
trade and privatize industries, which 
gave the US greater leverage in pro­
m oting exports and foreign invest­
ment. At the same time, social pro­
grams, including education and 
health care, were gutted while mal­
nutrition and hunger increased.
The num ber of people living in 
poverty increased by 39%, or 71 mil­
lion people, over the 1980s.
The striking aspect of C linton’s 
policy statements is that they focus 
on trade and investment to the 
exclusion of any discussion on the 
increasing maldistribution of wealth 
in the region. Like Bush, C linton’s 
emphasis has to prom ote NAFTA 
and hemispheric free-trade as the 
centerpiece for economic recovery. 
This is evident from a recent report 
issued by the Inter-American 
Dialogue, a m oderate think tank 
founded in the early 1980s to ana­
lyze Latin American affairs by a 
num ber of the adm inistration’s key 
personnel on Latin American issues 
(See article by Johanna Mendelson 
Form an).
The 1993 report, Convergence and 
Continuity: The Americas in 1993, 
places first priority on the ratifica­
tion of NAFTA and on progress 
toward a hem ispheric trade agree­
ment. Furtherm ore, the report 
stresses continuity in foreign eco­
nomic policy by emphasizing the 
im portance of keeping government 
spending low and minimizing gov­
ernm ent intervention in the Latin 
American economies. These mea­
sures are regarded as the best way to 
deal with poverty in the region.
The report argues for a “collective 
defense of democracy,” but offers 
little new in the way of proposals for 
advancing democratic institutions in 
the hemisphere. In fact, Richard 
Feinberg has argued that the open­
ing of trade and investment and the 
prospects for democratic consolida­
tion are tied together: “If a society 
fundamentally disagrees on funda­
mental issues—the nature of prop­
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To improve US competitiveness in a global 
economy, Clinton turns to Latin America
erty and what constitutes a legiti­
mate political system—democracy 
can’t handle it. If people agree on 
what constitutes good politics and 
good economics, the preconditions 
for democracy are in place.” (quoted 
by Doug Henwood in NACLA Report 
on the Americas, 26:5 (1993), p. 24).
Part of the continuity between the 
Bush and Clinton policies can be 
explained by structural factors. 
These include the end of the Cold 
War, the economic competition 
between the US, Japan, and the EC 
in the 1980s; the recessions in Japan 
and Europe in the 1990s; and the 
economic conditions faced by Latin 
American governments throughout 
the 1980s, which made Latin 
America more open to reducing 
trade and investment restrictions. 
These factors pushed Bush and 
Clinton away from military spend­
ing and toward trade and invest­
m ent initiatives in Latin America.
A nother reason for the Bush- 
Clinton continuity is the formation 
of business lobbying groups that are 
committed to securing greater 
regional trade with and investment 
in Latin America. Such lobbying 
groups have worked closely with 
both Bush and Clinton, and even 
helped to draft sections of the 
NAFTA agreement. Led by bank­
ing, financial services, telecomm uni­
cations, automobiles, electronics, 
and some textile firms, US indus­
tries jo ined  with Mexican firms as 
early as 1986 to form the Mexican- 
US Business Council to lobby for 
NAFTA. Now some of the most 
competitive and export-oriented US 
industries are pushing for a hem i­
sphere wide trade agreement.
Yet business supporters of NAFTA 
disagree on the reasons for pursu­
ing NAFTA, which could pose diffi­
culties for C linton’s plan to pro­
mote a hemispheric trade agree­
ment. Export-oriented and competi­
tive US investors in banking, finan­
cial services, retailing, and telecom­
munications prom oted an agree­
m ent that was free of trade barriers 
and discriminatory investment pro-
Business supporters of 
NAFTA disagree on the 
reasons for pursuing it, 
which could pose 
difficulties for a Clinton 
plan to promote a hemi­
spheric trade agreement.
visions. These firms valued NAFTA 
for its relaxation of trade and invest­
m ent constraints between Mexico 
and the United States. Their coun­
terparts in electronics, autos, and 
international textile firms saw 
NAFTA as regional protection 
against Japan and Western Europe. 
In fact, form er trade negotiator 
Ernest Preeg labeled the investment 
provisions of NAFTA "high-tech” 
regionalism to highlight its depar­
ture from the multilateralism of the 
General Agreem ent on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).
Regional free-trade agreements 
have been allowed under the GATT. 
Nonetheless, NAFTA goes beyond 
the intentions of the GATT provi­
sions in a num ber of ways. First, the 
NAFTA provisions on rules of origin 
are explicitly designed to limit 
Japanese and other foreign direct 
investment in Mexico in autom o­
biles, computers, and other high- 
technology sectors. GATT allows 
rules of origins agreements only to 
prevent circumvention of tariff bar­
riers by a third party that exports 
products to a low-duty country in 
order to bypass the tariffs of a high- 
duty country. The NAFTA provi­
sions go beyond preventing tariff 
circumvention by establishing high 
rules of origin standards, narrowly 
drawn definitions of value added 
requirem ents, and penalties for late 
entrants into the regional market.
The divisions am ong corporate 
supporters of NAFTA may have 
im portant implications for Clinton 
efforts to gain domestic support for 
this trade agenda. A wide range of 
US business interests supported 
NAFTA for diverse reasons, from its 
provisions increasing trade and 
investments to its restrictions on 
global competitors for the North 
American market. In addition, US 
exports to Mexico soared to $41.6 
billion in 1993, which placed 
Mexico behind only Canada and 
Japan as a m arket for US goods and 
services. Thus, more US business 
interests had a stake in lobbying for 
NAFTA than is the case with Chile 
or o ther Latin American countries. 
In order to secure its agenda, the 
Clinton team must guard against 
the possibility of business opposition 
to a hemispheric trade zone, espe­
cially if business firms perceive the 
plan as undercutting their competi­
tive position in the North American 
market.
Clinton policy may also face prob­
lems on other fronts, with some 
adm inistration officials insisting that 
the hemispheric trade initiative 
should be pursued slowly in order 
to deal more effectively with trade
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disputes with Japan and Western 
Europe. In a recent internal White 
House memo obtained by the New 
York Times, there was even some con­
cern that Mexico would ally itself 
with the next entran t into the free- 
trade pact in an effort to prevent 
the US and Canada from proceed­
ing with their plans for a giant free- 
trade area. Although Mexican offi­
cials denied this, the White House 
has already suggested ways to get 
around future objections by giving 
the US, Mexico and Canada equal 
votes on decisions to expand the 
pact, while future entrants would 
merely receive votes based on the 
volume of their trade.
A nother obstacle to the Clinton 
agenda is the potential opposition 
of organized labor and environmen­
tal groups, both at hom e and 
abroad, to US plans for increased 
trade and investment opportunities. 
The Clinton team felt obligated to 
attach labor and environmental side 
agreem ents to NAFTA in an effort 
to appease domestic critics. The 
side agreem ent on labor provides 
for the creation of a US-Mexican- 
Canadian commission based in 
Dallas, with an executive director 
and staff of about 15. The panel’s 
budget for 1995 will be about $3 
million and will be devoted to 
retraining and income support for 
workers at companies that have 
moved their operations to Mexico 
since NAFTA went into effect on 
January 1, 1994.
Many critics within the US labor 
movement, however, see the side 
agreem ents as woefully deficient in 
protecting US workers hurt by the 
agreem ent. Furtherm ore, most 
Mexican unions opposed NAFTA 
even with the side agreements, argu­
ing that it would do nothing to 
improve the conditions faced by 
Mexican workers, whose wages 
declined steadily in US owned 
assembly plants during the 1980s. 
Mexican workers in the auto sector 
have been attem pting to form
democratic unions by breaking away 
from the government-controlled 
Confederacion de Trabajadores 
Mexicanos (CTM). At the same 
time, US firms have worked with the 
Mexican state to control and, at 
times, to prohibit democratic union 
organization in Mexico.
For example, Ford, General 
Motors (GM), and Chrysler have 
shifted the principal location of 
automobile production from 
Mexico City to export-oriented m an­
ufacturing facilities in central and 
northern  Mexico. The relocation 
was based on three interrelated fac­
tors: the export incentives prom ot­
ed by the Mexican government, the 
virtual absence of independent 
labor organizations in the new loca­
tions, and the opportunities to 
restructure capital-labor relations 
on terms more favorable to capital. 
Where possible, firms preferred to 
deal with the relatively conservative 
CTM.
The actions of US auto firms have 
resulted in increasing conflict 
between the Big Three and democ­
ratic unions in Mexico. GM used its 
political leverage to ensure that its
engine and automobile plants at 
Ramos Arizpe were closed to dem o­
cratic unions. In 1980, the democ­
ratic union at GM’s Federal District 
plant fought a 106-day strike (the 
longest in Mexican history) for the 
right to represent workers at the 
northern  GM plants. According to 
political scientist Kevin 
Middlebrook, GM management, 
with the cooperation of CTM 
unions and the Mexican govern­
ment, won the battle, ensuring that 
the unions at Ramos Arizpe would 
be controlled by the CTM.
The international labor conflicts 
around NAFTA could be repeated 
in o ther contexts, as the Clinton 
administration prepares to expand 
the free-trade agreem ent on a 
hemispheric basis. Along the way, 
expect US labor groups to insist, at 
a minimum, upon protection for 
their m em bership in future trade 
agreements. The extent to which 
US labor groups form alliance’s 
with their international counter­
parts abroad is key to how much 
leverage they will eventually have 
over the future of labor and m an­
agement. I
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The Drug War is Dead...
Peter Andreas and Kate Doyle
C
andidate Clinton charged 
that the Bush war on 
drugs was “phony,” but 
President C linton’s “new 
and im proved” strategy 
has proven to be little 
m ore than a kinder and gentler 
replica. This is particularly true for 
US-sponsored drug control efforts 
in Latin America. U nderneath the 
softer, more under-stated packaging 
is the same basic supply-side drug 
control approach of years past. But 
the Clinton anti-drug strategy exists 
more by default than by design, 
m aintained by institutional inertia 
and a failure of imagination.
At first glance, Clinton appears to 
have made some notable changes. 
Gone is the militaristic and inflated 
rhetoric of earlier years—references 
to the “war on drugs,” for example, 
are noticeably missing in recent 
adm inistration reports and state­
ments. International drug control is 
presented as merely one piece of a 
larger foreign policy agenda that 
includes prom oting democracy and 
free-market economic reforms.
Gone is the crusading moralizing 
tone which so distinguished 
Republican predecessors. Perhaps 
most importantly, o ther pressing 
issues—health care, crime, the 
North American Free Trade 
Agreem ent—have largely m onopo­
lized the political spotlight since 
Clinton took office.
Signs of potential change in deal­
ing with drugs came early on in
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C linton’s term. In 1993, he slashed 
funding for the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) by 
80 percent, and then-Chief of Staff 
Thomas McLarty told the press, 
“President Clinton believes that 
resources to fight the drug problem  
should go to education, to treat­
m ent and to enforcem ent at the 
state and local level." The ONDCP 
is the drug czar’s office—a bloated 
institution which had come to sym­
bolize the get-tough, punitive 
approach to drug control under 
Republican leadership.
Latin American leaders, 
accustomed to having to 
appease Washington’s drug- 
phobia, wondered if  all the 
fuss about drugs during the 
Reagan/Bush years was 
merely a passing fad.
On its list of priorities, the 
National Security Council dem oted 
drug control from one of the top 
three to num ber 29 of 29. Moreover, 
the institutional guidance of the 
international drug control campaign 
was challenged when Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher requested 
that the State D epartm ent’s Bureau 
of International Narcotics Matters 
be merged with o ther missions, 
including terrorism and crime.
Consequently, Latin American 
leaders, who had grown accustomed 
to having to appease W ashington’s 
drug-phobia in order to secure US 
economic aid and diplomatic good 
will, rightly wondered if all the fuss
about drugs during the Reagan/ 
Bush years was merely a passing fad. 
US-Latin American trade issues, 
particularly the negotiations over 
NAFTA, quickly sidelined the securi­
ty concerns that had defined rela­
tions with the region in the 1980s. 
Attacking drugs, especially at the 
source of production, seemed to be 
relegated to the “back b u rn e r” of 
administration and public concerns. 
Clinton rarely even m entioned 
drugs since taking office.
Yet the appearance of a policy 
shift is deceptive. What is tempting 
to in terpret as a change in policy is 
perhaps better described as a course 
of neglect. Drug control has gone 
from high- to low-profile, but the 
substance of the international 
dimensions of the American 
anti-drug strategy remains largely 
intact. While Clinton has been less 
vocal than was Bush in his enthusi­
asm for foreign anti-drug cam­
paigns, the US strategy in Latin 
America, along with the institutions 
that have been mobilized to carry it 
out, remain firmly in place. 
Nevertheless, it would be an over­
statem ent to say that this is a care­
fully designed, deliberate policy 
decision by the administration. 
Rather, it is largely the result of 
bureaucratic m om entum  and a fail­
ure of will—a willingness to let the 
status quo continue while Clinton 
wrestles with issues considered to be 
more im portant.
Thus, the more things seem to 
have changed, the more they have 
rem ained remarkably the same. 
Rhetoric aside, C linton’s first drug 
budget was basically a carbon copy 
of the Bush plan; in C linton’s FY
1995 $13.2 billion request for anti­
drug programs, the main interna­
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tional shift was to shave a m ere $100 
million from the $1.2 billion inter­
diction budget.
According to Lee Brown, head of 
the ONDCP, the new strategy 
announced in February represents a 
“controlled shift” away from the 
Pentagon’s costly focus on sea and 
air lanes in Central America and the 
Caribbean toward “institution-build­
ing” and enforcem ent operations 
aimed primarily at major drug traf­
fickers in the main producer coun­
tries. “O ur effort is to try to stop 
the drugs before they leave the 
source countries,” Brown has noted. 
He told a congressional committee 
that “It’s easier to stop the drugs 
there than when they leave.” To 
those who have followed official 
rationales for foreign drug control 
campaigns over the years, Brown’s 
words will no doubt spark a feeling 
of deja-vu. In the late 1980s, it was 
George Bush who appealed to simi­
lar supply-side logic, arguing that 
“The cheapest and safest way to 
eradicate narcotics is to destroy 
them  at their source.”
Programmatic tinkering in the 
mix between interdiction and 
source country efforts is nothing 
new. In this case, it seems to have 
been prom pted by a September
1993 National Security Council con­
clusion that interdiction had proven 
far too costly and ineffective, but in 
the end, the declared shift in 
emphasis only reduces the interdic­
tion portion of the budget by seven 
percent. International drug control 
programs, on the o ther hand, are 
up by 22 percent over last year’s 
budget, from $351 million to almost 
$428 million. US funds allocated 
to international drug control are 
lower now than they were under
Bush, but the decrease is a result of 
last year’s congressional cuts, not 
the adm inistration’s. The Executive 
branch has sought to maintain or 
raise the level of spending for most 
programs since then.
The centerpiece of the 
freemarket campaign may 
also ease access to the 
American drug market 
As the flow of goods across 
the border increases 
under NAFTA, it 
becomes more and more 
difficult to “weed out” 
illegal flows.
M aintaining programs that have 
proven largely ineffective is often 
justified on defensive grounds. “We 
can’t stop our efforts—that would 
be to doom a num ber of these 
countries to even greater attack by 
narco-traffickers,” says Timothy E. 
Wirth, a State D epartm ent official 
who advises the W hite House on 
drug policies. Thus, rather than the 
gung-ho roll-back philosophy 
toward drug trafficking of the 
Reagan/Bush era, the Clinton 
approach sounds more like a policy 
of resigned containm ent. It is basi­
cally a kind of holding-action, dri­
ven by the belief that is easier to 
shift into a lower gear than to build 
an entirely new transmission.
Thus, in practice, operations on 
the ground continue on in much 
the same m ode as in previous years.
The list of drug-related programs is 
familiar: crop eradication, substitu­
tion, destruction of processing labs, 
targeting of major traffickers, jud i­
cial reform, and so on. While the 
role of the D epartm ent of Defense 
is scheduled to be scaled back 
slightly on the interdiction front, 
the Pentagon has asked Congress to 
approve its participation in training 
Latin American police forces.
The role of Latin militaries in the 
drug control effort will presumably 
be reduced as Pentagon-trained 
paramilitary police forces become 
operational. But while de-escalating 
the involvement of local militaries 
in the anti-drug campaign is wel­
comed by many, a greater role for 
militarized police forces means that 
the punitive supply-side logic of the 
strategy persists.
In Colombia, US assistance con­
tinues to focus on the twin objec­
tives of counterinsurgency and 
counternarcotics through support 
to the country’s police and military 
forces. The US provided intelli­
gence and communications support 
during the hunt for drug kingpin 
Pablo Escobar, and US military per­
sonnel operate ground-based radars 
to m onitor overflights of potential 
drug traffickers. American military 
teams continue to train with their 
Colombian counterparts, and US 
troops are helping the Colombians 
build a series of bases, according to 
US ambassador Morris Busby, to 
“increase the battlefronts against 
the guerrillas and narcotrafficking 
organizations.” Apparently, the 
administration is not particularly 
concerned about the continued 
blurring of the distinction between 
anti-drug and anti-guerrilla cam­
paigns.
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Meanwhile, the Colombian drug 
trade continues to flourish. Escobar 
is dead and the Medellin drug car­
tel is crippled, but the Cali cartel 
has quickly captured M edellin’s lost 
m arket shares, and is now responsi­
ble for some 80 percent of the 
cocaine exported to the United 
States. Moreover, both poppy and 
marijuana crops are expanding as 
Colombia’s drug entrepreneurs con­
tinue to diversity their exports. So 
far, the Colombian governm ent has 
shown little interest in confronting 
the Cali traffickers, although this 
may change as a result of highly 
visible US pressure on the new 
Colombian president, Ernesto 
Samper.
In Peru, the administration has 
renewed aid to the Fujimori govern­
ment, with $42 million requested 
for drug control. The US-funded 
Santa Lucia anti-drug base in the 
U pper Huallaga valley has been 
declared defunct as trafficking oper­
ations have moved out of the base’s 
range, but the US will reportedly 
support new mobile bases in the val­
ley and beyond. US-supported heli­
copters have been transferred to a 
facility in Pucallpa, 200 miles to the 
east, and State D epartm ent drug 
control funds will pay for future 
changes. Peru continues to produce 
about two-thirds of the world’s sup­
ply o f coca, the raw material for 
cocaine, which generates m ore for­
eign exchange than any other 
export.
For drug control operations in 
Bolivia, the administration request­
ed $68 million. The US is calling 
jo in t anti-drug efforts there a great 
success, noting Bolivia’s “political 
will” to curb the drug trade. The 
successes—measured num bers of 
arrests, am ount of drugs seized, and 
laboratories destroyed—have 
nonetheless barely dented  the 
nation’s expansive illicit export 
industry, which remains Bolivia’s 
single most im portant source of 
employment and foreign exchange.
While Bolivia has traditionally spe­
cialized in coca production, increas­
ing amounts of cocaine are now 
being refined as well.
Prohibiting the movement of 
some goods (i.e. drugs) 
while liberalizing virtually 
everything else is a recipe 
for policy frustration
There is more continuity than 
change in o ther areas of the adm in­
istration’s foreign drug control strat­
egy as well. In order to assure 
“progress” abroad, the Clinton 
administration plans to not only 
continue to tie economic aid to 
anti-drug objectives in the region, 
but promises to toughen the certifi­
cation process. In the past, critics 
charged that practicing such “condi­
tionality” failed to prom ote broader 
US international development 
objectives, and fostered mistrust and 
resentm ent among recipient 
nations. While the effectiveness of 
such a heavy-handed approach 
remains dubious, Washington offi­
cials apparently believe it gives them 
needed leverage over many drug 
producing nations.
In a rhetorical move, the adminis­
tration has also packaged its support 
for democracies and free-market 
reforms as contributing to the fight 
against drugs. According to the 
adm inistration’s most recent 
National Drug Control Strategy 
report, “...the growth of democracy 
and free-market economies presents 
new international narcotics control 
opportunities that did not exist a 
few years ago. The U nited States 
finds that democratic, market-ori­
ented governments are much easier 
to work with and more willing to 
cooperate with the international 
community in a common effort
against the illicit drug industry.
This allows greater international 
cooperation against the drug trade 
and...the development of more 
sophisticated and comprehensive 
strategies to reduce both the incen­
tive and capacity for international 
narcotics trafficking.”
This sounds reasonable enough, 
but in practice it is not at all clear 
that liberalizing markets will make it 
easier to prohibit illicit drug mar­
kets. Since licit and illicit markets 
are intimately intertwined in many 
of Latin America’s drug producing 
countries, m arket deregulation may 
actually have the effect of making it 
m ore difficult to regulate the drug 
trade. Prohibiting the movement of 
some goods (i.e. drugs) while liber­
alizing the movement of virtually 
everything else is a recipe for policy 
frustration.
For example, some drug control 
officials have acknowledged that 
NAFTA, the centerpiece of their 
free m arket campaign, may also 
ease access to the American drug 
market. The basic problem  is that as 
the flow of goods across the 
US-Mexican border increases under 
NAFTA, it becomes m ore and more 
difficult to “weed o u t” illegal flows. 
For example, about 1,700 trucks 
cross over to the United States from 
Juarez, Mexico every day. One US 
customs official conceded that “most 
trucks that go through customs go 
through almost unim peded.” U nder 
the trade agreement, trucking into 
the US from Mexico will expand sig­
nificantly, since Mexican truckers 
will eventually be able to travel any­
where in the United States and 
Canada. As an unhappy om en of 
things to come, US law enforcem ent 
officials believe that the biggest 
cache of cocaine ever seized in the 
U nited States (a one ton supply 
found in a Los Angeles warehouse) 
belonged to the owner of one of 
Mexico’s biggest trucking compa­
nies. The more things change, the 
more they stay the same. ■
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Southcom in the Andes
Sewall H. Menzel
O
ne team, one fight!
In the Andean drug 
war, the US military’s 
Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM) is the 
D epartm ent of Defense’s 
(DOD) lead agency. After roughly 
one decade of supporting US anti­
drug policy in the Andes, the bal­
ance of resources expended versus 
results garnered is causing some 
frustration for the US Government. 
Some notable tactical successes in 
intelligence, operations, training 
and logistical assistance have con­
tributed to the dismantling of entire 
narcotrafficking organizations, tem­
porarily disrupted cocaine produc­
tion and distribution, and led to the 
capture of drug “kingpins”. Despite 
these partial tactical victories, stem­
ming the tide of cocaine into the 
US is at best elusive and indeterm i­
nate.
Lessons from Bolivia
SOUTHCOM was thrown into 
counternarcotics operations during 
the mid-1980s as part of the Reagan 
adm inistration’s militarized 
approach to suppressing the flow of 
cocaine into the US. By the end of 
1985 the drug war in the Andes was 
bogged down in a quagmire of 
socioeconomic and political prob­
lems endemic to the cocaine pro­
ducing countries of Bolivia, Peru 
and Colombia.
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Able to plan, organize, coordinate 
and deploy Army, Navy, and Air 
Force com ponents from headquar­
ters in Panama, DOD was a logical 
candidate to become one of the 
lead agencies in embassy- and DEA- 
(Drug Enforcem ent Administration) 
sponsored anti-drug operations.
The possibility of 
the Andean militaries 
shooting down innocent 
civilians as a result of 
US intelligence reports 
casts an ominous shadow 
over aerial interdiction.
This capability was clearly dem on­
strated in 1986 when, with only two 
weeks notice from the White House, 
SOUTHCOM deployed the heli­
copter supported Task Force Janus 
(160 m en and six Blackhawk heli­
copters) in support of DEA-directed 
anti-drug forces in the semi-tropical 
plains of the Bolivian Beni. 
“Operation Blast Furnace” propelled 
the US military into the drug war in 
no uncertain terms. Ten years and 
several billions of dollars later, deci­
sive results have yet to be achieved.
In Bolivia, Blast Furnace’s initial 
impact on narcotrafficking was sig­
nificant but short-lived, owing to its 
focus on the laboratory system 
throughout the Bolivian Amazon. 
When the US military left, narco- 
traffickers immediately resumed 
production and marketing. By early 
1987, they were operating as though 
nothing had ever happened. US 
military strategists were convinced
that sponsoring similar operations 
on a sustained basis would resolve 
the problem.
That same year, under the code 
name “Red D ragon”, the US 
Embassy in La Paz hosted a series of 
SOUTHCOM Special Forces (Green 
Berets) teams, which trained the 
Unidad Movil de Patrullaje Rural 
(UMOPAR), Bolivia’s elite rural 
anti-drug police. UH-1 helicopters 
and “Piranha” swift boats became 
part of the plethora of assets that 
DOD and SOUTHCOM provided in 
support of the DEA/UMOPAR 
operations.
At a SOUTHCOM conference in 
Panama, statements from Ann 
Wrobleski, then Deputy Assistant 
Secretary at the Bureau of 
International Narcotics Matters 
(INM), confirmed that the US did 
not have a sound overall anti-drug 
strategy: “We just operate!” was the 
policy in play. In military circles, 
comparisons to the erstwhile US 
policy during the Vietnam War were 
unavoidable. As in Vietnam, success­
ful tactical operations were conduct­
ed in the vacuum of a genuine strat­
egy focused on an enemy “center of 
gravity” (a Clausewitzian term ).
In the military, identifying a cen­
ter of gravity is vital to plan the use 
of military assets for decisive results. 
The key question then is: What is 
the center of gravity in the Andean 
drug war? Is it the hundreds of 
thousands of coca farmers spread 
throughout the Aides? the thou­
sands of laboratories? the air, land, 
sea, and riverine transportation sys­
tems? precursor chemicals involved 
in the production of cocaine prod­
ucts? the drug lords, or their min­
ions/organizations? While the 
debate raged, US anti-drug efforts
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shifted back and forth over a spec­
trum  of “centers of gravity.” 
SOUTHCOM continued to provide 
Tactical Assistance Teams (TATs) to 
the US Embassy in La Paz to assist 
in the operational planning and tar­
geting of narcotrafficker activities.
In 1989, the Commander-in-Chief 
o f SOUTHCOM General Maxwell 
Thurm an put forth a strategy con­
structed on Blast Furnace’s lessons. 
He wanted to put US military forces 
in the field, pitting them  directly 
against narcotraffickers. While 
T hurm an’s proposal did not m eet 
with the approval of the Bush White 
House, it was instrum ental in 
expanding SOUTHCOM’s role in
intelligence, training, and opera­
tions planning.
T hurm an’s Operation “Support 
Justice” placed radars in Santa Cruz 
and in the Beni (Bolivia), while aeri­
al platforms in the form of AWACs 
(Airborne Warning and Control 
System) aircraft provided inform a­
tion to so-called Joint Tactical 
Intelligence Coordinating Centers 
in country. Through Operation 
“Stone Bridge,” US Navy SEALs and 
Marines trained Bolivian Navy and 
Police riverine patrols while Green 
Berets trained infantry battalions in 
anti-drug functions.
SOUTHCOM’s activities did 
enable the DEA and Bolivian anti­
drug police to break up and dis­
mantle the several im portant drug 
trafficking organizations, including 
the infamous Isaac “Oso” Chavarria 
clan. Despite the success of pre­
venting about a third of Bolivia’s 
cocaine production from reaching 
US shores, (representing only about 
10 percent of the world total), nar­
cotrafficker resilience enabled the 
cocaine m anufacturing process to 
flourish even under the increased 
presence of US military support.
Even civic action efforts, used 
extensively in Vietnam, were 
brought into play in Bolivia to 
ameliorate the potentially negative 
image of a heightened US military
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presence. Despite medical facilities, 
schools, and runway construction 
projects, civic action became 
extremely controversial. In 1993, 
when the Bolivian Congress failed 
to approve US troop presence, these 
activities were canceled.
Peruvian Failures
In Peru, SOUTHCOM support 
operations m irrored activities in 
Bolivia, but with even more dismal 
results. Owing largely to a complex 
alliance between the Shining Path 
insurgents and the narcotraffickers, 
the DEA base at Santa Lucia in the 
U pper Huallaga Valley proved inef­
fective in stemming the flow of 
roughly two-thirds of the world’s 
cocaine supply (about 1,000 metric 
tons)— not for want of US military 
support.
SOUTHCOM worked around the 
problem  by im plem enting an aerial 
interdiction support campaign 
using ground based radars along 
the north  Peruvian border with 
Colombia in conjunction with 
AWACs aircraft to deal with the 
reported  70 to 90 narcotrafficker 
flights per m onth (interspersed 
among hundreds of o ther legitimate 
commercial flights). US radar on 
the ground and in the air handed 
off suspected targets to the Peruvian 
Air Force which proceeded to force 
or shoot down suspected narcotraf­
fickers. A two year tally by early 1992 
indicated that some 124 aircraft had 
been reported  as shot down (out of 
an estimated total of some 2,000 
flights) and things were thought to 
be going reasonably well until May
1992, when the Peruvian Air Force 
shot down one of SOUTHCOM’s C- 
130s on a clandestine reconnais­
sance mission. The controversy gen­
erated by this incident put US- 
Peruvian military relations on ice 
for about a year. Since the narcotraf­
fickers saturated the airways and 
flew at night, smuggling continued 
via state-of-the art narco-aircraft 
guided on SOUTHCOM radar
beams, flying at tree top level to 
avoid detection.
Narcotraffickers merely 
ivrite off the losses inflicted 
by SOUTHCOM and other 
anti-drug agencies as the 
cost of doing business.
Colombian Promises
In Colombia, SOUTHCOM 
focused considerable support and 
effort beginning in the late 1980s. 
Multi-service training and support 
teams work with Colombian Navy, 
Marines, Army and Air Force units 
operating in conjunction with the 
governm ent’s anti-drug police 
forces. Intelligence, logistics, opera­
tions and m aintenance trainers, 
advisors and technicians have been 
brought into play to enhance the 
airlift support and air surveillance 
capabilities of the Air Force, the 
riverine capabilities of the Marine 
Corps and the ground capabilities 
of the Army. Green Berets, SEALs 
and Marines are now allowed to 
accompany Colombian military and 
police forces on anti-drug “training” 
patrols against the narcotraffickers. 
As in Bolivia, US Army civic action 
construction projects stirred a huge 
controversy and were curtailed in
1993.
In terms of intelligence support, 
the US military’s role is significant. 
Ground based radars, AWACs and 
other all-source intelligence gather­
ing systems have assisted in the cap­
ture of some key narcotraffickers 
plying their trade throughout 
Colombia. In addition, Aerostat 
radar balloons operating as part of 
the Caribbean Basin Radar Network 
have ham pered the flow of narco­
trafficker aircraft through Central 
America and the Caribbean.
After spending about $1 billion for
the aircraft and ships to detect and 
m onitor drug smuggling, SOUTH­
COM estimates that between 1,500 
and 3,000 aircraft and some 3,000 
to 5,000 drug smuggling ship move­
ments take place each year. Aircraft 
entering and exiting Colombia 
alone have a choice of some 497 
authorized airports and another 
roughly 1 1,000 dirt airstrips. 
Traffickers have also resorted to 
fiberglass mini-submarines.
Ironically, the aerial interdiction 
issue came to a head in early May
1994 when the Pentagon and other 
governm ent legal authorities per­
suaded the National Security 
Council and the president to stop 
sharing US radar anti-drug aerial 
intercept inform ation with the 
Andean governments. There was an 
evolving, yet sincere fear, on the 
part of the US governm ent that the 
US was inadvertently making itself 
party to hum an rights violations.
The possibility of the Andean mili­
taries shooting down innocent civil­
ians as a result of US intelligence 
reports casts an ominous shadow 
over the aerial interdiction portions 
of the US anti-drug policy. That the 
change in the policy was made 
abruptly with little or no coordina­
tion with the governments of 
Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia added 
considerably to existing tensions 
that had arisen from the US’s appar­
ent lack of confidence in its deal­
ings with Andean anti-drug allies.
The US military’s intelligence tar­
geting and interdiction support 
efforts were part of President Bush’s 
Andean Initiative. This was part of 
a deliberate “three tier” anti-drug 
interdiction strategy for the 
Americas (disrupting narcotraffick- 
ing along the US frontier, in Central 
America and the Caribbean, and 
the Andes) im plem ented from 1989 
into 1994. Yet all was not well.
A Septem ber 1993 report from 
the General Accounting Office 
(GAO/NSIAD 93-220:3) concluded 
“the governm ent’s investment in
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military OPTEMPO [flying hours 
and naval steaming days] does not 
appear to be providing a reasonable 
return. Estimated cocaine flow has 
not appreciably declined and most 
drug smugglers are not interdicted.” 
Reacting to the critical report and 
its own analysis which indicated that 
the drug flow from the Andes had 
not been sufficiently curtailed as to 
effect its availability on US markets, 
the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy’s new strategy for 1994 began 
a “controlled shift” of interdiction 
assets to Colombia, Peru, and 
Bolivia. President C linton’s 
Presidential Directive 14 effectively 
curtailed the Bush “three tier” strat­
egy to focus principally on the 
Andes.
DOD worried that overall combat 
readiness of the SOUTHCOM 
forces involved in anti-drug opera­
tions m ight be eroded by the
expanded military role in the drug 
war. Using military equipm ent 
designed for fighting wars but 
employed for law enforcem ent was 
no longer cost effective. Funding 
for military anti-drug surveillance 
grew from $212 million in fiscal year 
1989 to $962 million in fiscal year 
1992.
Facing the Truth
Why does narcotrafficking flour­
ish in the face of extensive US mili­
tary anti-drug activity and deadly 
confrontations with local govern­
m ent police and military forces?
The answer lies in the fact that the 
US military, at the behest of the US 
government, has seized upon a false 
center of gravity focused on the sup­
ply side structure of the narcotraf­
fickers in the Andes. The key center 
of gravity, only now beginning to be 
understood by the US governm ent
but no t yet properly addressed, lies 
on the dem and side. Strong 
dem and, reinforced by high profits 
involving thousands of dollars per 
kilogram of cocaine produced and 
sold in the United States and 
Europe, drives and motivates the 
supply structure of narcotrafficking 
in the Andes. Narcotraffickers 
merely write off the losses inflicted 
by SOUTHCOM and other anti­
drug agencies as the cost of doing 
business. When one narcotraffick­
er group is brought to bay and 
forced out of business, another 
merely rises and continues the for­
m er’s place. As in Vietnam, the 
focus on a false center of gravity in 
the drug war strategy has stymied 
the US government and its military, 
preventing anti-drug policies from 
achieving decisive results. ■
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Politics of Perception
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Images & Intervention: US Policies 
in Latin America
by Martha Cottam
Pitt Latin American Series,
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994. 
226 pp., bibliography and index.
D
rawing on the framework 
of political psychology, 
political scientist M artha 
Cottam analyzes the last 
half century of US for­
eign policy in Latin 
America. Now well into the post- 
Cold War era, Cottam asserts that 
North-South relations in the hem i­
sphere have altered little since the 
bipolar days, and does not antici­
pate change so long as the US 
image of Latin America as “depen­
den t” continues to hold.
Across a range of cases, Cottam 
identifies US policy makers’ cogni­
tive image of Latin American coun­
tries as dependent—weak, inferior, 
childlike, inept, and corrupt—as 
the prime mover of coercive policies 
characterized by “ordering rather 
than negotiating, using coercive 
instrum ents when none are called 
for, and expressing contem pt for 
the dependen t’s people” (p. 63). 
The shift from coercive behavior 
into outright coup (intervention) 
occurs when Latin American gov­
ernm ents become associated with 
the perception of the enemy, as in
Jennifer E. Smith is a recent graduate of 
the M.Phil. program in Latin American 
Studies at Oxford University, where she 
wrote her thesis on US Drug Policy in 
Peru in the 1980s. She is now a 
researcher in Washington, DC.
the cases of Guatemala (1954), post- 
1960 Cuba, and Chile under 
Allende (1970-73). Despite the 
inauguration of radical reform  poli­
cies in 1952 Bolivia, no such inter­
vention occurred because the gov­
ernm ent of Victor Paz Estenssoro, 
by winning the advocacy of then- 
President Eisenhower’s brother 
Milton, m anipulated its image away 
from associations with the enemy. 
Similarly, the Peruvian nationaliza­
tions of the late 1960s-early 1970s 
invoked the dependent image, 
which inspired some medium-range 
economic sanctions, but forestalled 
the likelihood of outright US inter­
vention. During the Central 
American crisis, the perception of 
the isthmus’s association with the 
enemy explains the intense preoc­
cupation with containm ent/rollback 
strategy that began at the tail end of 
the Carter administration, peaked 
under Reagan, and dim inished as 
the Eastern bloc began to crumble 
during the adm inistration of 
George Bush.
The dependent image of Latin 
America, however, did not change; 
and perhaps more menacingly, gun­
boat diplomacy took on a new 
unpredictability with the dissolution 
of containm ent as a unifying securi­
ty goal. The December 1989 US 
invasion of Panama, for example, 
dem onstrated that “the enemy 
image simply conditions the nature 
of the intervention...without con­
tainm ent, the m anner of interfer­
ence is less predictable...the percep­
tion and evaluation of the depen­
dent [regime] ...and US domestic... 
conditions take on much greater 
importance. The instruments, on 
the o ther hand, still resemble...gun­
boat diplomacy” (p. 162).
Explorations into the connections 
am ong image, perception, and 
power politics take on new and 
urgent relevance in this age of the 
m edia onslaught. Opinions held by 
and relations among decision mak­
ers are form ed not over a series of 
interactions, but instantaneously, 
through television and print media. 
Similarly, the choices of leaders can 
be narrowed and broadened by con­
stituents’ perceptions of public poli­
cy issues. For a num ber of years 
leading up to the US Congressional 
vote on the N orth American Free 
Trade Agreement, Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas orchestrat­
ed a masterful public relations blitz 
to sell a new image of his country as 
the m odern civilization of unlimited 
socio-economic potential (See 
report by Raul Benitez Manaut). 
Fidel Castro’s successful manipula­
tion of the Imperial Yankee has the 
net effect of narrowing options for 
Cuban citizens: no m atter how tight 
things get, it’s better than living 
with the enemy. And most shame­
lessly, the protagonists in the Haiti 
drama unfurl one image after 
another to achieve their separate 
ends.
But perhaps more than in any 
other public policy debate, the US 
governm ent’s war on drugs fights a 
constant battle—which it sometimes 
wins—with perception and image. 
US policymakers tend to define 
anti-drug efforts as an actual or 
potential security threat. Latin 
Americans, in contrast, present nar­
cotrafficking more as a problem  of 
public health and law enforcement. 
Only since the waning days of the 
Cold War, and presumably motivat­
ed by a desire to tap into US 
resources, have Latin American gov­
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ernm ents been willing to define 
narcotrafficking principally as a 
national security threat. In practice, 
US political hegemony, and its con­
trol over valuable external funding 
resources, has m eant that Latin 
Americans concede to US percep­
tions and definitions of public poli­
cy issues, or face the consequences. 
A recent example is the highly visi­
ble squabble between the Clinton 
State D epartm ent team and the 
new Colombian president,
Ernesto Samper, who, immedi­
ately after his electoral victory, 
was sum m oned to Washington 
to “discuss” his pending anti­
drug strategies.
Reinforcing im portant 
disagreements over public 
policy issues are the 
monolithic perceptions 
touted by Latins and 
N orth Americans 
regarding each 
o ther’s civilizations.
Latin Americans i
view American A
dem and for drugs 
as a natural consequence 
of that society’s vice-ridden, exces­
sive consum er mentality. US gov­
ernm ent anti-drug efforts, there­
fore, are a placebo as long as 
dem and continues. On the other 
hand, even am ong the educated 
personnel at the Bureau of 
International Narcotics Matters, US 
perception of Latin Americans is 
colored by the old myths of the 
Black Legend and the inheren t cor­
ruptibility and lawlessness of 
Spanish colonials. US anti-drug 
strategy, through less vitriolic under 
Clinton than under his predecessors 
(see article by Andreas and Doyle), 
indicate that the image of being
dependent and associated with an 
enemy continue to influence
inform ation processing
and strategy selec­
tion.
It will be interesting to see if and 
how this changes as we leave the 
Cold War era behind.
C linton’s foreign policy team is 
(for the m om ent) composed of 
many form er Carter staffers. One 
test of Cottam ’s argum ent may be to 
see how a modified cold warrior 
team reacts to Latin American crises 
during a period of less obvious ene­
mies. C linton’s treatm ent of Haiti, 
for example, exhibits most of the
characteristics that Cottam identifies 
with a dependent image in the 
absence of the enemy. W ithout the 
unifying goal of containm ent, policy 
has been subject to a wide variety of 
conflicting domestic concerns, con­
tributing to highly inconsistent 
strategies which have been 
assailed from virtually all 
parts of the political spec­
trum.
Clinton, while campaigning, 
stated that he did no t agree 
with Bush’s refugee policy of 
strict repatriation, but did not 
reverse the policy upon his elec­
toral victory, realizing the political 
costs of accepting a flood of poor 
Haitians into Florida. A nother key 
source of support, the African- 
American political community, 
denounced the policy as racist, and 
this too has been an im portant fac­
tor in pushing C linton’s Haiti team 
in o ther directions. Indeed, the 
past two years of policymaking have 
witnessed a pendular movement, 
from strict repatriation to the possi­
bility of asylum hearings aboard US 
ships to no chance of refugee reset­
tlem ent in the US. Agreements with 
o ther countries to accept some 
refugees have been largely unsuc­
cessful, even Panama reneged on a 
previous offer. As of this writing, 
economic sanctions have not been 
useful and the intransigence of the 
ruling Haitian military, com bined 
with m ounting squabbles here at 
home, have made the threat of US 
military intervention practically a 
political necessity. If military action 
does take place, Cottam’s contention 
that intervention assumes its most 
coercive form where the dependent 
image works without the enemy asso­
ciation will be borne out. ■
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